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QUARTERING SPECIES: THE "LIVING CONSTITUTION," THE
THIRD AMENDMENT, AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT
BY
ANDREW P. MoRRiss* AND RICHARD L STROUP**
The authors argue that the fundamental flaw in the Endangered Species Act
(ESA) is that it fails to force government decision makers to consider the
opportunity cost of their actions, resulting in flawed decision making that
imposes heavy costs on landowners without actually protecting endangered
species. The authors develop this analysis through an examination of the
ESA in light of the modern "living Constitution" theory of interpretation.
They conclude that under this theory the ESA's "quartering of species" on
private land violates the Third Amendment's ban on quartering soldiers.
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What part did [judges] act in preventing your houses (which by law are to
every man a place of refuge and safety) from being made barracks for the
-soldiery? Did they execute the penal statute of our mother country against it,
or did not some of them act a shameful neutrality while others united with
power and in its very council abetted the illegal attempt?'
[A]ny property holder who currently farms his land, utilizes it for extractive
purposes, or contemplates making improvements in the future must worry
about the ESA .... The ESA, in short, is every property owner's nightmare.
2
I. INTRODUCTION
Many modem judges and scholars subscribe to a constitutional
philosophy that treats the Constitution as a living document subject to
"contemporary ratification" that must be interpreted in light of society's
"current problems and current needs."3 Although we harbor some doubts
about the wisdom of unmooring the Constitution from the Framers' intent
and the specific words they chose for the Constitution's text, the widespread
acceptance of this theory by constitutional scholars 4 led us to examine the
consequences of a "living Constitution" analysis for the neglected Third
Amendment' Our conclusion is that, under a "living Constitution" theory,
I A Letter to the People of Pennsylvania, in PAMPHLr OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION,
1750-1776 257,269 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1965) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter BAILYN].
2 Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act A Case Study in Takings &
Incentivs, 49 STAN. L REV. 305,344-45 (1997).
3 William J. Brennan, Jr., Presentation to the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), in
AMEICAN CoNSTrITUTONAL LAW 607,610 (Mason & Stephenson eds., 8th ed. 1987).
4 See, e.g., Michael Les Benedict, Constitutional History and Constitutional Theory:
Refections on Ackerman, econstruction, and the Transformation of the American
Constitution, 108 YALE LJ. 2011, 2012 (1999) (*[N]o analyst denies that [changes in
constitutional provisions through judicial interpretation] have occurred; we have had, for good
or ill, a 'living Constitution.'"); Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 FORD. L REV.
1519, 1522 (1999) (-[Tlhe living constitution... is derived by analyzing the contemporary
discourse in the spirit of a cultural anthropologist attempting a thick description of the
powerful symbols used in courts .... *); Arlin M. Adams, Justice Brennan and the Religion
Clauses: The Concept of a 'Living Constitution," 139 U. PA. L REV. 1319,1320 (1991) (Justice
Brennan saw his role as "defender... of a 'living Constitution."); ARTHUR SELWYN MnlLER,
SOCIAL CHANGES AND FIRMAMENTAL LAW: AMERICA'S EVOLVING CONSTITUTION 349 (1979) ("The
idea of the living Constitution thus is a justification for adaptation of the basic document to fit
new social exigencies."). Some constitutional scholars propose even more radical approaches.
See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Ant(fiddity, 70 S. CAL L REV. 381, 411 (1997) (rejecting the
"living Constitution" approach as not able to eliminate the "dead-hand problem" or supply us
with "the Framers' answers to our problems"). 
k
6 U.S. CONS'. amend. fI. The few commentators who consider the Third Amendment
worthy of analysis concur on its neglected status. Professor Tom Bell notes in his
comprehensive survey of the Third Amendment that 'the Third Amendment languishes in
comparative oblivion. The scant attention that it does receive usually fails to serve it well.
THE THIRD AMENDMENT AND THE ESA
the Endangered Species Act (ESA) is unconstitutional because, through the
ESA, the federal government "quarters" living creatures on privately held
land, a position analogous to-and sometimes more serious than--the
explicit textual ban on the peacetime quartering of soldiers imposed by the
Third Amendment
Although some readers may at first frind the suggestion that the Third
Amendment applies to the ESA humorous or silly, 7 we think it is no sillier
than many of the "living Constitution" interpretations offered in the past for
other portions of the Constitution's text 8 Indeed, as one commentator on an
early draft of this Article pointed out to us, the colonists who quartered
British soldiers not only were forced to provide them with shelter but were
also forbidden to shoot, or "take" in ESA parlance, the soldiers they
quartered.9 Even if no court ever adopts our analysis, considering the ESA in
light of the Third Amendment offers a valuable insight into why many
Americans find the ESA so burdensome and frightening. Understanding
those burdens is the key to reforming the ESA so that it accomplishes what
should be its primary objective: protecting endangered species in a
sustainable way.
10
In Part II, we briefly outline the "living Constitution" method of
constitutional interpretation. In Part I, we describe the historical
background of the Third Amendment and apply the "living Constitution"
method to it In Part IV, we describe the Endangered Species Act and the
practical problems it creates for landowners. In Part V, we apply the
Lawyers twist it to fit absurd claims, the popular press subjects it to ridicule, and academics
relegate it to footnotes."eTom W. Bell, The Third AmendmenLt Forgotten But Not Gone, 2 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 117, 117 (1993). An earlier analysis noted that "[t]he few stage appearances of
the Third Amendment before the Supreme Court have been in dramas of primary constitutional
magnitude even if its habitual role has been as an extra with a non-speaking part." Seymour W.
Wurfel, Quartering of Troops: The Unlitigated Third Amendment, 21 TENN. L REV. 723, 732
(1951). Another labeled it a *poor cousin" and noted that "[s]tudents of American constitutional
history dismiss the amendment as an insignificant legal fossil." B. Cannon Hardy, A Free
People's Intolerable Gr ene The Quartering of noops and the Third Amendment, in THE
BILL OF RIoHTs: A LIVELY HERrrAGE 67 (Jon Kukla ed., 1987). William Fields and David Hardy
wrote in 1991 that few parts of the Constitution "have been relegated to more obscurity" and
that the amendment had gone *virtually unnoticed" for two hundred years. William S. Fields &
David T. Hardy, The Third Amendment and the Issue of the Maintenance of Standing Armies
A Legal History, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HsT. 393,393-94 (1991). Peggy Noonan in a recent essay on
the amendment called "[tihe poor Third... ignored, unloved, unnoticed." Peggy Noonan, Expect
the Unexpected: Why the Third Amendment May Once Again Be Needed, in AMEmcAN
PERSPE CIvES 1, 3, available at http'/wwwl.mightywordscom/asp/booldnfo/
booldnfo.asp~theisbn=EB00000828 (last visited Sept. 9, 2000). A 1979 New York Law Journal
article summed up the Third in its title: What Ever Happened to the Third Amendment? Search
Reveals Judges, Bar Treat It As a Constitutional Stepchild Frank B. Lewis, What Ever
Happened to the Third Amendment?, N.Y. L., Feb. 26, 1979, at 1.
8 Endangered Species Act of 1973,16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
7 Some lacking a sense of humor will possibly find it offensive. Tough.
8 See discussion infra Part U.
9 Thanks to Andrew Rutten for pointing this out to us.
10 "Sustainable" here incorporates the notion that to last, a statutory approach must be seen




principles developed in Part I to the Endangered Species Act. Finally, we
examine how endangered species protection can be made both consistent
with the Third Amendment and more effective at actually protecting
endangered species.
U1. THE "LIVING CONSTITUrION" AND CONSTIUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
The phrase "living Constitution" apparently first appeared as the title to
a 1927 book by Howard Lee McBain. 1 The term has since been used in a
variety of ways, from a justification of a broad style of judicial
interpretation 12 to a narrow notion of applying established principles to new
situations.13 As we use the term here, "living Constitution" reflects the
tradition inspired by the New Deal of a "dynamic, living Constitution, which
changed as social and economic needs demanded."' 4
As articulated by one of its strongest advocates, former Justice William
Brennan, the "living Constitution" method of interpretation rejects the
notion that constitutional claims be upheld "only if they were within the
specific contemplation of the Framers"16 and rejects the restriction of
"claims of right to the values of 1789 specifically articulated in the
Constitution." 6 It also rejects the notion, which Justice Brennan termed
"perhaps more sophisticated" than the "facile historicism" of originalism,1
7
that courts -must defer to the will of the majority expressed through the
11 Benedict, supra note 4, at 2012, n.3 (citing HOWARD LEE MCBAN, THE LIMVNG
CONSnITUHON: A CONSIDERATION OF THE REAmEs AND LEGENDS OF OUR FUNDAMENTAL LAW
(1927)). See also G. Edward White, The 'onstitutional Revolution" as a Crisis in Adaptivity,
48 HASFMGS LJ. 867,874-79 (1997) (tracing the emergence of the "living Constitution" term).
12 This approach is usually identified with Justice William Brennan and the Warren Court in
general. See Adams, supra note 4, at 1319 ("This view of the Constitution as a living and
evolving document whose interpretations should not be cabined by too literal a quest for the
Framers' intent is a position that Justice Brennan consistently defended and thoughtflully
espoused in his opinions regarding the first amendment religion clauses. It constitutes one of
the many contibutions by this great jurist."). See also Stephen Reinhardt, The Anatomy of An
Execution- Fairness vs. "Process," 74 N.Y.U. L REv. 313, 314 (1999) ("The Warren Court--the
Warren-Brennan era--will be remembered for that legacy (an era in which courts acted as
protectors of the rights of the poor, disenranchised, and underprivileged. The Court's decisions
were guided by a broad, humanitarian vision of the role of the judiciary and of the Constitution
as a living document."). Other justices, including Byron White and Hugo Black, have also been
tagged with the "living Constitution" label. See Bernard W. Bell, Byron B. White, Kennedy
Justice, 51 STAN. L REv. 1373, 1393 (1999) ("Justice White's approach was heavily precedent-
based and incremental, but a 'living Constitution' approach nonetheless."); Charles A. Reich,
Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HAMRv. L REv. 673, 703 (1963) ("Uke every
other part of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights was framed to meet the problems known in the
eighteenth century .... Justice Black has been the leading advocate of giving the Bill of Rights
safeguards a meaning appropriate to contemporary contexts.").
13 See William Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L REv. 693, 694
(1976).
14 Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Theory Tmnsfrmned, 108 YALE LJ. 2115,2136 (1999).
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legislature. "It is the very purpose of a Constitution--and particularly of the
Bill of Rights-to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of
temporary political majorities." 8 Thus, a "living Constitution" interpretation
requires
an approach to interpreting the text [that] must account for the existence of
these substantive value choices, and must accept the ambiguity inherent in the
effort to apply them to modem circumstances. The Framers discerned
fundamental principles through struggles against particular malefactions of the
Crown; the struggle shapes the particular contours of the articulated
principles. But our acceptance of the fundamental principles has not and
should not bind us to those precise, at times anachronistic, contours.
Successive generations of Americans have continued to respect these
fundamental choices and adopt them as their own guide to evaluating quite
different historical practices.19
The "ultimate question" of interpretation, therefore, must not be what
the words literally say but "what do the words of the text mean in our
time."2 From this we can derive three principles of interpretation to use in
our examination of the Third Amendment and the ESA
(1) The Constitution's text informs interpretation but does not limit
interpretation to the plain meaning of the text itself.
(2) The Constitution's meaning must be interpreted in light of the
social realities of the present, not of 1789 or any prior moment.
(3) The Constitution must be interpreted to give effect to the principles
expressed in the text in the context of contemporary social and
political problems.
11. THE TMRD AMENDMENT
The text of the Third Amendment is straightforward- "No Soldier shall,
in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the
Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law."2' Unlike
some of the other parts of the Constitution, this language appears to be
straightforward and susceptible to a plain and obvious interpretation: the
Founders did not want soldiers put into people's houses in peacetime
without the homeowner's consent or during wartime without legal process.
22
18 I at 610.
19 Id.
20 Id. See a/so Adams, supra note 4, at 1330-31 (Brennan's "stance is one in which
sensitivity replaces dogmatic rules, and a view in which continuum resides; one which honors
original intent and, yet, adapts it to contemporary issues; one which permits the judicial
interpreter to breathe deeply and see broadly.).
21 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
22 See, e.g., Wurfel, supra note 5, at 729 ("Perhaps it is because it deals with a single limited
subject in simple concise language that the Third Amendment has not provoked litigation.');
William Sutton Fields, The Third Amendment: Constitutional Protection from the Involuntary
2000]
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And most accounts of the adoption of the Third Amendment take a fairly
literal approach to the Amendment, such as that in Edward S. Corwin's The
Constitution and What It Means Today: The Third (and Fourth)
Amendments
sprang from certain grievances which contributed to bring about the American
Revolution. They recognize the principle of security of the dwelling which was
embodied in the ancient maxim that a man's house is his castle. There has
never been an instance of an attempted violation of the prohibition.2
3
However, this focus on specific words is inconsistent with the "living
Constitution" analysis. The First Amendment's Free Speech Clause is also
superficially clear-"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech"24-yet scholars and the courts have determined that the Framers
did not mean "Congress ,"' "no law"28 or "speech'2 when they wrote that
provision. The Constitution's prohibition on bills of attainder' is another
provision which, if taken literally, could be characterized as a "constitutional
antique of little significance to today's world."1 However, Justice Hugo
Black argued that a liberal reading of the clause prohibits statutes denying
pay to named employees,30 government blacklists, 31 and denial of social
security benefits to deported Communist aliens.3
2
Thus, plain meaning is not a bar, in this view, to understanding the
principles behind the Third Amendment To determine those principles, we
need to briefly examine the history of the Amendment In doing so, we must
remember that we are not to be limited to the "precise, at times
anachronistic, contours" erected by the English Crown's "particular
malefactions" 3 in quartering soldiers. Rather we should strive to unearth the
Quartering qf SoIdier, 124 MIL L Ray. 195, 196 (1989) ("The lack of controversy engendered
by the right makes it unique and is indicative of the broad consensus as to both its purpose and
meaning."); Noonan, supra note 5, at 4 (The Third Amendment is "easy enough to
understand.-).
23 EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 341 (Harold W. Chase
& Craig R. Ducat eds., 14th ed. 1978).
24 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25 See James L Oakes, The Proper Role of the Federal Courts in Eqforcing the BiU of
Rights, in THE EVOLVING C NoIsTLMON 169,184-85 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1987) (dismissing as a
"technical quibble" the First Amendment's "peculiarly explicit wording" concerning 'Congress"
rather than the government generally)..
26 See, e.g., Chapllnsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("There are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which
have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or fighting' words .... ").
27 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,505 (1969) (holding that wearing
a black armband is "speech"); King v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 101 Cal. Rptr.
660,664 (Cal. Ct. App.1972) (holding that wearing a beard is "speech").
28 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
2 Reich, supra note 12, at 710.
30 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946).
31 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 144 (1951) (concurring
opinion).
32 Flemmilng v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603,627 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
33 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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principles behind the Third Amendment's text as inspired by those
malefactions.
A. The Colonial Experience with Quartering
Understanding the American experience with quarteringe requires a
brief survey of the contemporaneous practices in Britain,3 for it was against
British practice that Americans measured the burdens of quartering.
Moreover, "[t]he American concern for protecting the rights of private
homeowners against quartered troops was the product both of direct
experience and their English political heritage. "3
English town and borough charters, even before the Magna Carta,
attempted to restrict quartering abuses, and these charters "are the major
legal antecedents of the Third Amendment"' Three principles run through
these charters as follows: quartering was to be done in accordance with
established legal procedures; local civilians, not military commanders, were
to decide where quartering would take place; and most importantly,
quartering had to be voluntary.1
In reaction to a long history of abuses in England,3 Parliament passed
the Anti-quartering Act of 1679,10 which forbade involuntary quartering, and
the Mutiny Act of 1689,41 which forbade quartering soldiers in private homes.
The Mutiny Act did allow quartering "in Inns Livery Stables Alehouses
34 "Quartering" involved providing more than shelter. Those called upon to quarter troops
were required to furnish extensive supplies as well. English public house owners, for example,
had to choose between giving troops food and beer at statutorily mandated prices or providing
the troops "with candles, vinegar, salt, five pints of small beer or cider, utensils, and firing."
SrANLy McCRoRY PAGES,, LORD LOuDouN iN NoRTH AMERICA 188 (1933). In theory, early
British practice involved compensation for anything the troops took by giving receipts that
could be used to gain reimbursement. "In practice, however, these receipts often proved to be
worthless, and 'billeting' came to signify free room and board" by the end of the sixteenth
century. Bell, supra note 5, at 123. See also Fields & Hardy, supra note 5, at 400 (describing the
receipts given by the soldiers as "worthless).
35 For a history of British quartering practices, see Bell, supra note 5, at 118-24. See also
Fields, supra note 23, at 195-99; Fields & Hardy, supra note 5, at 395-413. "Protections against
forced billeting appear to be a uniquely British invention, well-rooted in Anglo-Saxon law." Bell,
supra note 5, at 118. See also JOSEPH PLESCiA, THE BILL Op RioiTS AND ROMAN LAW: A
CoMPARIvE STuDY 63-64 (1995) (noting that Roman law's original restriction of quartering to
non-citizens was abolished in 212 A.D., making all but those specifically exempted subject to
quartering).
36 Hardy, supra note 5, at 80.
37 l at68.
38 Id
39 Bell notes the mention of complaints about quartering in the 1628 Petition of Right by
Parliament and as a factor in the English Civil War. Bell, supra note 5, at 123-24. See also
Hardy, supra note 5, at 69-70 (describing how Charles I's military ambitions, and Parliament's
unwillingness to provide revenue for the military, led to the billeting of soldiers in private
homes). Hardy summarizes quartering practices in the Middle Ages as "often brutal, subjecting
to peril a householder's beds and goods on the approach of any army, friend or foe." Hardy,
suprm note 5, at 68.
40 31 Car. H1, c. 1, § 54 (Eng.).
41 1 W. & M.,. 6 (Eng.).
2000)
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Victuallinghouses" and the like,42 but it failed to allocate funds to build
sufficient barracks space.
, Over time, military infrastructure developed and solved the quartering
problem.43 "In England and Wales troops were stationed in permanent
camps, and when they took to the road, along a route determined by a civil
official, the secretary at war, they found shelter according to the rigid
specifications of the Mutiny Act in inns and public houses with which the
country abounded."' In Scotland, however, public houses were smaller and
fewer in number, and troops were sometimes placed in private homes.46
Colonial Americans thus understood the quartering of troops as something
to be undertaken either by the military directly, through construction of
permanent camps, or by innkeepers but not by the general public.
At first, American conditions did not produce quartering issues as "[tihe
colonists built their defenses around an adapted militia system," and the
militia were rarely out of their home counties.46 However, along with the
appearance of a British military presence, so quartering problems appeared
too.47 American conditions made the English solution unworkable: troops
covered greater distances, troop movements were irregular in the French
and Indian Wars, and American inns were fewer in number and smaller than
their English counterparts. As a result, quartering in America was more
likely to resemble the Scottish practice than the English one. Not
surprisingly, Americans found this objectionable. Some colonies followed
New York's lead and enacted specific bans on quartering.'8
"The problem of quartering troops... first became acute in 1754 and
1755 when accommodations had to be made for [Major General Edward]
Braddock's army."' The Pennsylvania Assembly refused to authorize
payment for either building barracks or compensating those who housed the
troops, insisting on the "'undoubted right' of British subjects... 'not to be
burdened with the sojourning of soldiers against their will.' "60 Braddock
42 Id.
43 See Fields & Hardy, supra note 5, at 415 ("The escalation in the size of armies and their
camp followers during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries had made haphazard
quartering of soldiers obsolete.*). Part of the original quartering problem was due to 'logistics
not keeping pace with the development of armies themselves." Hardy, supra note 5, at 70.
44 PARGEWS, supra note 34, at 188.
46 Id.
46 Hardy, supra note 5, at 73.
47 Fields, supra note 22, at 199 ("[P]roblems resulting from the quartering of soldiers
amongst the civilian population had occurred through the history of the colonies each time
there had been a significant British military presence.*).
48 Hardy, supra note 5, at 73-76. In 1683, New York enacted a law stating that "Noe
Freeman shall be compelled to receive any Martiners or Souldiers into his house and there
suffer them to Sojourne, against their willes provided Alwayes it be not in time of Actuall Warr
within this province." Charter of Ubertyes and Priviledges, reprinted in 1 THE ROOTS OF THE
BiLl OF RIGHTS 166 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1980).
4 9 BAILYN, supra note 1, at 702. See also BURNHAM HOLMEs, THE THIRD AMENDMENT 37 (1991)
("British troops were first quartered, or housed, in America during the French and Indian War"
beginning in 1754.).
50 BAILYN, supra note 1, at 702.
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replied by warning that he would "take care to burthen those colo ies the
most, that show the least loyalty to his Majesty."51 When the colony's
governor moved to requisition private homes in 1756, the Colonial Assembly
"cut him off, disputing with him, through a committee, with 'heat, passion,
and rudeness.
' " 2
Instead, the Pennsylvania Assembly attempted to extend the Mutiny Act
provisions on quartering to its territory.'3 In doing so, the Assembly included
.a preamble explaining that "it was an undoubted right of subjects not to have
soldiers quartered on them against their will; no officer, civil or military
should presume to transgress this right; any subject could refuse, legally, to
quarter."5
4
Interestingly, colonists did not resist all attempts to quarter troops. In
some areas British authorities approached the problem quite differently than
Major General Braddock had-offering incentives for those willing to
quarter. Those authorities, like Massachusetts Governor and Commander in
Chief William Shirley, "avoided raising the quartering issue by the simple
expedient of scattering the Crown's money with a lavish hand,"' spending
almost two thousand pounds in May 1756 alone.' What colonists resisted
was the requirement that they subsidize the military by bearing the burden
of quartering. As an influential pamphlet in the late 1760s noted, if British
authorities could order a colony to provision its troops then they could "lay
any burthens they please upon [the colony]."57
British authorities used the stick as well as the carrot. Lord Loudoun,
for example, required Albany, New York to provide shelter with beds, firing,
and candies for thirteen hundred men in the winter of 1757, but later
resumed payments for fuel, bringing to an end a "flurry of actual oppression,
to show the inhabitants the length to which a commander in chief might go if
he were a less merciful man."
61 Jeffrey L. Scheib, Barracks for the Borough: A Constitutional Questionfor Lancaster, 87
J. LANCASTER COUNTY HIST. SocY 54 (1983).
52 BAILYN, supra note 1, at 703.
53 PARGiEUS, supra note 34, at 191.
54 ld. (citing V Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania 194).
55 JCL
56ld. Similarly, in 1756 Lord Loudoun pacified colonists agitated over quartering by paying
for his own quarters at the "princely rate of five pounds a week" and using Crown funds to help
supply troops. Moreover, *[t~he inhabitants replaced their trade with the French with a more
lucrative one with the army, and no further trouble arose until the autumn of 1757, when
Loudoun's greatly enlarged army went into winter quarters." Id. at 196.
67 JOHN DICKINSON, LE'iERS FROM A FARME IN PENNSYhVANIA, To THE INHATANTS OF THE
BITISH COLONIES (1767-68), quoted in THEODORE DRAPER, A STRUGGLE FOR POWER: THE
AMERICAN REvoumoN 305 (1996).
58 PARGELUS, supra note 34, at 198. See a/so PARGELLS, supra note 34, at 199 (Loudoun
threatens to take quarters in New York City by force if they are not voluntarily provided), 201
(Loudoun threatens to march on Pennsylvania to secure quarters), 206 (Loudoun's strategy
explained as "insisting upon less than he explained was his rightful due... and by holding
always in the background the threat of force*). The British army understood the punitive power
of quartering. After the Boston Massacre prompted the withdrawal of British forces in Boston to
Castle Island in Boston Harbor, the troops sang, as they awaited reinforcements:
2001
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The quartering disputes, caused in part by the lack of formal legal
authority for British commanders to quarter their troops in the 1750s, led to
the first explicit Parliamentary authorization for quartering of soldiers in
America, the Quartering Act of 1765.59 This legislation was sought by
General Thomas Gage, commander of the British Army in America. ° Gage
had experienced trouble with voluntarily quartering troops in America
during the Seven Years War (1756-1763), and his troubles increased after the
end of the war.8 ' In 1765, he reported that difficulties were "increas[ing] very
fast ' As historian Merrill Jensen writes,
Americans denied that the Mutiny Act extended to America except for the
clauses in it naming America. Americans tempted soldiers to desert, hid them,
and bought their clothes and arms. Officers who captured deserters who had
become indentured servants were seized, prosecuted, and fined. Officers had
even been sent to jail for living in the quarters assigned to them. Others had
been prosecuted for taking carriages while on the march. Gage said that such
examples were rare but that the news was spreading and that it would soon be
difficult to keep the soldiers in the service and to march and quarter them
without "numberless prosecutions, or perhaps worse consequences."6
To solve the problem of limited quarters, Gage proposed that justices of
the peace and other magistrates be "required" to quarter soldiers in private
homes, whose owners would have to accept statutorily set rates of
compensation.64 King George III, however, rejected the idea of directly
authorizing forcible quartering in private homes.' The 1765 Act, as it
ultimately emerged, did not permit nonconsensual quartering in private
homes, although it did allow quarters in inns, livery stables, and ale houses
and if these proved inadequate, other private buildings.
Nonetheless, the "direct result" of Gage's report was the Quartering Act
of 1765, which "became a major source of conflict and, as amended in 1774,
Our fleet and our army, they soon will arrive,
Then to a bleak island, you shall not us drive.
In every house, you shall have three or four,
And if that will not please you, you shall have half a score.
Derry down, down, hey derry down.
Hardy, supra note 5, at 78-79 (quoting SONGS AND BALLADS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTrON 51-52
(Frank Moore ed., Kennikat Press 1964) (1855)).
59 5 Geo. 3, ch. 33.
60 MERRILL JENSEN, THE FOUNDING OF A NATION: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
1763-177666 (1968).
62 ld. at 67.
6 I& See also JOHN RICHARD AWDEN, GENERAL GAGE IN AMERICA 109 (1948) (describing
resistance to the Mutiny Act after the end of the French and Indian War); DRAPER, supra note
57, at 202 (quoting Gage).
64 JENSEN, supra note 60, at 67.
66 Id. at 67-68. See a JOHN SHY, TOwARD LEXINGTON: THE ROLE OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN
THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 185 (1965) (noting that Lord Grenville advised the
King that the quartering of soldiers in private homes was "by far the most likely to. create
difficulties and uneasiness")..
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was one of the Intolerable Acts that led to war.' z Even the relatively
moderate provisions contained in the 1765 Act, essentially requiring the
colonies to contribute to the support of the British Army in America,
provoked substantial opposition. New York, for example, engaged in a long-
running 'dispute with British officials over the requirements of the
Quartering Act 67 By the end of 1767, New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia,
and Massachusetts had also taken steps to oppose it in various ways.68
Americans did not accept that the new Quartering Act resolved the
issue. Bostonians complained, for example, that "[t]he quartering of troops
upon British Americans, in time of peace, is quite repugnant to the Bill of
Rights, and a measure that always has been considered as an intolerable
grievance, by a free people."6
The need for the Quartering Act in 1765 was questionable. As historian
John Shy notes, horses and wagons could be procured on a contract basis,
barracks provided at government expense, and troop movements scheduled
for seasons when units could camp overnight 7 And, Shy notes, an ad hoc
solution had already arisen to the quartering problem, a solution that rested
on such voluntary arrangements.7 1 Nonetheless, Gage pushed for legislation
to formally solve the quartering problem, rather than rely on market
transactions. Gage's insistence on a statute transformed the quartering issue
from an economic transaction into a political one: "[Bly trying to codify a
delicate modus vivendi, Gage destroyed it. By assuming the inevitability of
American resistance, he helped to make it inevitable.'
The feature of the Quartering Act that the colonists found most
objectionable was its requirement that they involuntarily provide housing
(and food and other goods) for the troops. As John Dickinson, a prominent
colonial politician, wrote in a widely circulated series of letters on British
policy,
[IJf the British parliament has legal authority to issue an order that we shall
furnish a single article for the troops here, and to compel obedience to that
order, they have the same right to issue an order for us to supply those troops
with arms, cloth[es], and every necessary;, and to compel obedience to that
66 SHY, supra note 65, at 164. The Quartering Act was passed at the same time as the Stamp
Act. ALDEN, supra note 63, at 109. *As a result, the problems related to the'quartering of soldiers
became entwined with the volatile political issue of 'taxation without representation.'" Fields,
supra note 22, at 200.
67 JENSEN, supra note 60, at 213. New York's refusal to comply with the Quartering Act led
the British government to suspend the colony's assembly until it complied. SHY, supra note 65,
at 250. See also ALDEN, supra note 63, at 122-23 (describing conflict between Gage and the New
York assembly), 153-54 (describing conflict between Parliament and New York assembly);
DRAPER, supra note 57, at 291-93 (describing the crisis). The financial burdens of the
Quartering Act were also cited in the Circular Letter of 11 February 1768, circulated by the
Massachusetts House of Representatives. JENSEN, supra note 60, at 250.
68 SHY, supra note'65, at 250.
69 Hardy, supra note 5, at 7&.
70 SHY, supra note 65, at 180.
71 d. at 250 (-[Ilt is strildng to see how far most colonies were willing to go in supporting
the regular troops stationed or marching within their borders.").
72 SHY, supra note 65, at 181.
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order also; in short, to lay any burthens they please upon us. What is this but
taxing us at a certain sum, and leaving to us only the manner of raising it? How
is this mode more tolerable than the Stamp Act?73
Dickinson's letter cleverly linked quartering to another major American
grievance: imposition of taxes by a body in which Americans had no
representation. Thus, as Dickinson pointed out, quartering was
objectionable for the same reasons as the Stamp Act. Quartering was also
worse than a simple tax because it fell unevenly on the colonists. British
military commanders decided where their troops would quarter, but the
costs of quartering were borne unequally among the colonists. In modern
economic terms, the military decision makers faced less than the full
opportunity cost of their decisions.
The Quartering Act was amended again in June 1774 as part of what the
colonists soon labeled the "Intolerable Acts," aimed at punishing Boston for
the Boston Tea Party.74 James Phinney Munroe notes that the new quartering
act went "out of its way to irritate the inflamed citizens of Boston."7 Under
the 1774 amendments, soldiers could now be quartered wherever needed,
including in private homes.7 As the name suggests, Americans found the
experience intolerable.77 Peggy Noonan summarized the experience of
Americans who were forced to quarter British soldiers:
These were strangers in the house. The colonists did not appreciate having
agents of the very government they wished to throw off reading in the parlor
and eating at their table. And the troops stationed in civilian houses were
soldiers-sometimes coarse, often uneducated, occasionally unruly,
73 DICIaNSON, supra note 57, at 44-45.
74 See JENSEN, supra note 60, at 457; DON COOK, THE LONG FUSE How ENGLAND LOST THE
AMERICAN COLONIES, 1760-1785 188 (1995) (CUttle wonder that the Coercive Acts passed by the
English Parliament became known as the Intolerable Acts when they were published in
America.").
75 James Phinney Munroe, Last Chance for the Empire, in 2 COMMONWEALTH HISTORY OF
MASSACHUsErrs 514,518 (Albert Bushnell Hart ed., 1966).
76 JENSEN, supra note 60, at 457; ROBEr" W. TucxER & DAVID C. HENDRICKSON, THE FALL OF
THE FIRST BRrIISH EMPIRE: ORIGINS OF THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 316 (1982)
(contrasting the Quartering Act with the previous state of affairs, when troops could only
quarter in uninhabited houses and buildings). There is some controversy over whether or not
the 1774 Act allowed quartering in private homes. See Don R. Gerlach, A Note on the
Quartering Act of 1774, 39 NEw ENGLAND QuAmRERLY 80 (1966) (arguing that Act's text did not
authorize quartering in private homes); HOLMES, supra note 49, at 66 ("The Quartering Act of
1774 did not openly state that soldiers could be quartered in private homes. However, the
colonists feared that this might be the meaning of 'other buildings.' The colonists remained
uncertain about the interpretation of this law by the British Army, as well as by the government
officials who were Tories .... ). Regardless of whether the 1774 Act authorized quartering in
private homes, it is clear that, at least in some instances, British authorities did so. See, e.g.,
Scheib, supra note 51, at 58 (describing quartering-related conflicts between British soldiers
and Lancaster residents). The resolution of this dispute is well beyond the scope of this Article
and rests on the actual practice of the British army as well as the text of the statute. We assume
that the 1774 Act did produce quartering in homes, in part because this makes our task more
difficult as we must analogize to homes rather than simply to property.
77 See Bell, supra note 5, at 126.
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sometimes alcoholic. There were complaints of violence and ill-treatment78
As a result, both the First Continental Congress's Declarations and
Resolves of October 14, 17749 and the Declaration of Independence
denounced the practice 80
B. The Constitutional Response
Quartering soldiers was a subject that Americans felt strongly about.
Six of the state conventions from the original thirteen colonies proposed
texts on quartering soldiers to the Congress.81 Six states had their own
constitutional or statutory provisions against quartering soldiers.82 The
practice had also been the subject of grievances by Englishmen and
Americans from 16278 through 1776.84 The absence of a constitutional bar
on quartering played a role in the Anti-Federalist campaign against
ratification of the Constitution.'8 For example, the Federal Farmer, an Anti-
Federalist pamphlet series, editorialized in 1787 and 1788 that the
Constitution's lack of restrictions on quartering soldiers was a reason to
oppose the Constitution.80 Opposition to the quartering of soldiers in private
homes was both widespread and noncontroversial in the Founding Era. If
there was to be a Bill of Rights, inclusion of a federal constitutional ban on
quartering was uncontroversial.
The text of the Third Amendment changed remarkably little during the
drafting process from James Madison's original proposal to the House of
Representatives on June 8, 1789.87 The House debate on the text centered on
proposals to make the prohibition more absolute by removing the wartime
exception 88 and, when that failed, by requiring a civil magistrate to
78 Noonan, supra note 5, at 5.
79 1 JOURNAIS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789 63,69 (1904).
80 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE par. 16 (U.S. 1776) (including "For Quartering large
bodies of armed troops among us .... *among a list of grievances against the King).
81 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS § 5.1.2, at 215-16 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997), (Maryland
(minority), New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Virginia). See also 4
LEGISLATIVE HISTORIEs: AmMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH FOREIGN OFFICERS BILL
{H.R. 116115-26 (Charlene Bangs Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE
HISTORIES] (giving text of state proposals).
82 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supm note 81, § 5.1.3, at 216-17 (Delaware, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and New York.).
83 1627 3 Car. 1, c. 1 (Eng.) quoted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 81, § 5.1.4.1,
at 217.
84 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 80 ("For Quartering large bodies of
armed troops among us).
86 Hardy, supra note 5, at 81.
86 THE FEDERAL FARMER, No. 6, December 25, 1787 & No. 16, January 20,1788 quoted in THE
COMPLETE BIL OF RIGHTS, supr note 81, § 5.2.4.1-5.2.4.2, at 220-21.
87 See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 81, § 5.1.1.1, at 207 (quoting Madison's
original proposal "No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house without the
consent of the owner, nor at any time, but in a manner warranted by law'). Fields and Hardy
note that the text "differed little" from the initial proposal. Fields & Hardy, supra note 5, at 425.
88 THE COMPiL-E BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 81, § 5.1.1.5, at 208 (Motion by Sumpter in the
House, Aug. 17, 1789, "to strike out all the words from the clause but 'No soldier shall be
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determine whether the quartering could occur.89
In the brief debate over these proposals, the proponents of stricter
restrictions argued that where owners did not consent, "[t]heir property
would lie at the mercy of men irritated by a refusal, and well disposed to
destroy the peace of the family."9 The amendment's opponents, however,
argued that "it was absolutely necessary that marching troops should have
quarters, whether in time of peace or war, and that it ought not to be put in
the power of an individual to obstruct the public service; if quarters were not
to be obtained in public barracks, they must be procured elsewhere."91
Similarly, in opposing the "civil magistrate" amendment, another delegate
argued "that cases might arise where the public safety would be endangered
by putting it in the power of one person to keep a division of troops standing
in the inclemency of the weather for many hours.. . ."12 By August 24, 1789,
the House had settled on the language of the Third Amendment. 3
The most significant change from Madison's original proposal
concerned the different standards for peacetime and war. Madison's
proposal drew a distinction between "time of peace" and other times. The
final amendment text changed that to a distinction between "time of peace"
and "time of war.' 4 Professor Tom W. Bell has creatively analyzed this
change, noting that Madison's version and the final text differ in the rules
governing conditions that were neither peace nor war.9 Madison's proposal
required legislative action for such circumstances, but the final text was
ambiguous.
C. Principles of the Third Amendment
What are the principles behind the Third Amendment? As shown above,
the Third Amendment was certainly motivated in part by the outrageous
behavior of the Royal Government that quartered soldiers in colonial homes
quartered in any house without the consent of the owner"). See also LEGISLATIVE HsORIEs,
supra note 81, at 29 n.15.
89 THE COMPETE B"LL OF RIGHTS, supra note 81, § 5.1.1.6, at 208 (Motion by Gerry in the
House, Aug. 17, 1789 "to insert between 'but' and 'in a manner' the words 'by a civil
magistrate'"). See also LEGISLATIVE HISTORlES, supra note 81, at 29 n.14 (motion by Gerry to
insert "by a civil magistrate" voted down 35-13).
90 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 81, § 5.2.1.2.a, at 218 (Sumpter).
91 IU (Sherman).
92 Id. § 5.2.1.2.a, at 219 (Hartley). Some have read this relatively narrowly-Laurence Tribe
and Michael Dorf, for example, cite the Third and Fourth Amendments as evidence of "special
solicitude for the home." LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CoNs'TrImoN
117 (1991). However, the Tribe-Dorf formulation does not fully capture the quartering problem
as understood by colonial Americans. Many of the quartering disputes did not involve private
homes but attempts by British authorities to require colonials to pay for the quartering of troops
in taverns and public houses. Resistance to quartering thus extended beyond the home to
coerced payments to house unwelcome soldiers elsewhere.
9 THE COMPLrE BL OF RIGHTS, supra note 81, § 5.1.1.7-5.1.1.8, at 209. There was a debate
in the House and Senate over a number of amendments, including what was to become the
Third. Id at210-14.
94 See Bell, supra note 5, at 129-34.
95 Id. at 135-36.
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during peacetime. Americans resented sharing their homes with often rude
and boorish strangers, a practice that carried with it financial losses and a
loss of privacy and control of property. Drawing on this experience, Thomas
Cooley summed up the need for the Third Amendment by saying:
It is difficult to imagine a more terrible engine of oppression than the power in
an executive to fill the house of an obnoxious person with a company of
soldiers, who are to be fed and warmed at his expense, under the direction of
an officer accustomed to the exercise of arbitrary power, and in whose
presence the ordinary laws of courtesy, not less than the civil restraints which
protect person and property, must give way to unbridled will; who is sent as an
instrument of punishment, and with whom insult and outrage may appear quite
in the line of duty.9
More recently Akhil Amar similarly phrased the need for the Third
Amendment as aimed at preventing the "more insidious forms of military
occupation, featuring federal soldiers cowing civilians by psychological
warfare, day by day and house by house."9
The pre-Intolerable Acts quartering disputes also undoubtedly played a
significant role in shaping the constitutional response. Americans objected
not only to sharing their homes with British soldiers, but also to the
quartering of troops at their expense when the decision to quarter was at the
sole discretion of the British military authorities. As shown above, this was
by far the most common colonial experience with quartering.
Additionally, the experience with the Intolerable Acts suggests that,
along with "penumbras, formed by emanations"N from the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, the Third Amendment expresses a principle of privacy and
security in private property. 9 It must do more than this, however, because
the pre-Intolerable Acts experience centered on resistance to paying for the
military's decisions to quarter troops. We therefore argue for a broader
interpretation than simply construing the Third Amendment as restating the
privacy concerns of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The Third
Amendment is an expression of the principle that Americans cannot be
compelled by the federal government to share the occupancy of their
property with others. It thus embeds within the Constitution the American
expectation of voluntarism in shouldering the burdens of quartering. This
principle includes the specific malefactions that led to the actual text of the
Amendment, and fits the three principles set out earlier.
First, the Constitution's text informs the interpretations but does not
limit interpretation to the plain meaning of the text itself. Our proposed
principle is rooted in the behavior that motivated the Framers, but
generalizes their concern.
Second, the Constitution's meaning must be interpreted in light of the
96 THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LiMITATIONS WHICH REsT UPON THE
LEGISLAnNG POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 435 (7th ed. 1903).
97 AxHmI REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTs: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 59 (1998).
9 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (describing "zones of
privacy').
99 Id. (stating that the Third Amendment is "another facet of... privacy").
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social realities of the present, not of 1789 or any prior moment. It seems safe
to say that the Framers, concerned as they were by a standing army of
relatively small size aimed at local disturbances, would be utterly mystified
by our sprawling defense establishment and role as the world's policemen.
With no serious military threats to the territory of the United States and with
the existence of national relationships we suspect that many of the Framers
would term "foreign entanglements," America is more likely to quarter
soldiers in Bosnia and Japan than in American homes. °° Indeed, military
establishments have become so domestically popular that special measures
are necessary to reduce their presence, rather than to protect civilians from
soldiers. 0 1 Because the federal government now pays fully (to the low
bidder) for the quartering of its soldiers, military bases are widely lobbied
for. The Founders would also likely be surprised to learn that the federal
government had taken an interest in grizzly bears and red cockaded
woodpeckers. Since soldiers are no longer being forcibly quartered on
private property but bears and woodpeckers are, applying the Third
Amendment to the latter better reflects current "social realities" than does
an exclusive focus on soldiers.
Finally, the Constitution must be interpreted to give effect to the
principles expressed in the text in the context of contemporary social and
political problems. The scope of the federal government has grown
considerably since the Founding. As a result, individual eighteenth century
Americans' contacts with federal employees (or even representatives of the
crown before the Revolution) were far more likely to be with military
personnel than they are today. Given the broadened scope of non-military
federal actions, the Third Amendment should be read to guide our
understanding of these activities as well.
Another alternative is possible and needs to be considered. Some
commentators have focused on the civilian-military relationship as the key
to the principles behind the Third Amendment (and the Second Amendment
as well).102 For these writers, the principle expressed by the Third
Amendment is that the military must remain subordinate to civilian
authority 103
We offer four responses to this interpretation. First, it does not
preclude the interpretation we have given. If the Constitution's text is strong
100 See, e.g., Gabe Masaald, Okinawa Summit No Solution to U.S. Military Base Issues, 47
JAPAN Q. 10 (2000) (describing Japanese opposition to U.S. military presence on Oldnawa).
101 See, e.g., Jessica K Reynolds, Military Base Closure Oversight via Environmental
Regulations. Replacing Judicial Review of Closure Decisions and Methods with
Comprehensive Alernative Redevelopment Mechanisms, 4 ALB. L ENvrL OUTLOOK 40 (1999)
(tracing history of domestic military base closures).
102 See, e.g., AMA , supra note 97, at 59-63 (discussing the Third Amendment as "centrally
focus[ing] on the structural issue of protecting civilian values against the threat of an
overbearing military"); Fields & Hardy, supra note 5, at 395 (quartering problem is "by its
history and nature so intimately connected with the large political issue of the 'standing army,'
that in the end, the successful resolution of that larger issue for practical purposes rendered
[the Amendment) superfluous").
103 AMAR supra note 97, at 62-63.
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enough to bear the strains that the "living Constitution" approach puts on it
generally, it is certainly strong enough to express a principle about security
of property ownership simultaneously with a principle about the relationship
of military to civilian authority.10 4 Second, to the extent it does conflict with
our interpretation, we believe ours is more closely rooted in the existing (if
sparse) Third Amendment jurisprudence, which expresses concern with
privacy issues, not civilian-military relations 105 Blackstone, for example,
emphasized the individual rights nature of the common law right against
quartering."0 6 Third, even if our interpretation precluded a civilian
supremacy interpretation, other provisions of the Constitution deal with the
civilian-military conflict' 07 Concerns about those issues, concerns we share,
are adequately addressed by those provisions. Fourth, subordination of
military to civilian authority does not recognize the full extent of the
problem quartering was intended to address. Colonists objected to the
quartering of troops even after Parliament (the civilian authority) passed the
Quartering Act of 1765. Their objection was thus not that there was not some
civilian control of the British military (which existed in Parliament). Rather,
their objection was that the colonists themselves were not able to control
the imposition of the costs of the military's quartering decisions.
Indeed, the closest functional relationship of the Third Amendment's
text may well be to the Takings Clause. Just as that constitutional provision
limits the government's ability to take private property without
compensation, so the Third Amendment layers an additional restriction
upon the specific takings of land that fall within its purview. 10
IV. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
The Endangered Species Act is a sweeping piece of command-and-
control legislation, dictating that certain favored species (those listed as
endangered) will be granted extraordinary levels of protection from human
impacts. The Supreme Court described it as "the most comprehensive
104 See, e.g., AMw, supra note 97, at 61-63 (discussing how the Third Amendment expresses
federalism and privacy principles in addition to its civilian-military focus).
106 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (listing Third Amendment
prohibition against quartering of soldiers as another facet of privacy); Engblom v. Carey, 677
F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir. 1982) (using a privacy based rationale to interpret Third Amendment
claim).
106 1 WniAM BLACWSIoNE, COMMENTARIES *400 ("[T]he petition of right enacts that no
soldier shall be quartered on the subject without his own consent...."). See also Fields &
Hardy, supra note 5, at 411-12 (*In short, the common law recognized an individual right
against the involuntary quartering of soldiers that was separate and apart from the related
concept of whether a standing army was an especially appropriate way of defending a free
republic.7).
107 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8; art. 11, § 2; amend. II.
108 See Bell, supm note 5, at 146 (Bell notes the parallel, but argues that courts "must not
treat peacetime quartering as merely another form of taking. Unless they levy punitive damages
or other penalties against those responsible for this illegal and unconstitutional behavior, the
Third Amendment's consent requirement will offer no more protection from quartering than the
Fith Amendment's taking clause.").
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legislation for the preservation of species ever enacted by any nation."'09 The
Congressional Research Service labeled the ESA "one of this country's most
important and powerful environmental laws.""10 It is an environmental
symbol of the highest order-with one environmental historian comparing it
to the Declaration of Independence."' Unlike other national environmental
laws, which often temper their goals by requiring action only where
practicable, the ESA "elevated protection of all species to one of the U.S.
government's highest priorities" 12 without tempering it with concerns for
feasibility or cost."3
One of the problems the ESA was intended to protect against, habitat
destruction, is a serious one: "Habitat destruction and degradation are by far
the leading threats to biodiversity, contributing to the endangerment of at
least eighty-eight percent of the plants and animals on the endangered
species list.""4 Extensive action has been taken under the ESA-1,201
species are now listed as endangered or threatened, and millions of acres of
public and private land are subject to restrictions on use because of the
presence of listed species."5
The ESA's form, however, creates numerous problems. Chief among
these is that public or private landowners on whose property an endangered
species is found are subject to extensive restrictions on the use of their land.
In light of this problem, it is no surprise that the success of the ESA in
actually saving species is questionable at best. In May of 1998, the Secretary
of the Interior announced at a press conference that twenty-five years since
the ESA was passed, twenty-nine species, out of 1,138 listed, would be
removed from the endangered and threatened species lists."8 But of those
that had been delisted, five were removed due to their extinction, four were
removed because their listing had been due to taxonomic error, ten more
had been initially listed due to data error, and several others, arguably, had
recovered for reasons other than the ESA.1
7
109 Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill (TVA v. Hill), 437 U.S. 153,180 (1978).
110 M. Lynne Corn, Endangered Species Act Issues, CONG. REs. SERV., May 27, 1992, at 1.
II JosEPH M. PmruuA, AMEicA Ei N oNMENrrAusM 51 (1980) ("The legal idea that a listed
nonhuman resident, of the United States is guaranteed, in a special sense, life and liberty has
shocked countless human residents.").
112 ROCKY BARKER, SAVING ALL THE PAirs: RECONCIUNG THE ENDANGERED SPECIES AcT 20
(1998).
13 Id.
114 David S. Wilcove, The Promise and the Disappointment of the Endangered Species Act,
6 N.Y.U. Ewn-L LJ. 275,277-78 (1998).
115 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, available at http:/www.endangered.fws.gov/
boxscore.htmd (last updated Nov. 30,1999).
115 Press Release, Department of the Interior, Babbitt Announces New Policy, Plans to
-Delist" Endangered Species (May 6,1998), available at http'/lwww.nwi.org/SpecialStudies/
BabbittReport/DIOrelease.htin (last visited Oct. 17,2000).
117 A report listing the species that had been delisted is the National Wilderness Institute's
"Babbitt's Big Mistake," released in July, 1998, available at httpJ/www.nwi.or/SpecialStudies/
BabbittReport/Overview.htznl (last visited Oct. 17, 2000). See also Richard L Stroup, The
Endangered Species Ack Making Innocent Species the Enemy, PERC POUCY SERIES PS-3
(1995), at http'/www.perc.org/ps3.hn (last visited Oct. 17, 2000) (attributing the recovery of
the bald eagle, brown pelican, peregrine falcon, and gray whale to factors other than the ESA);
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How can such a powerful piece of legislation be performing so
miserably? The ESA's flaws cannot be attributed to inadequate authority or
even lack of funding. In 1993, more than $500 million federal dollars were
spent on endangered species protections, across many agencies, and the
figure had been rapidly rising.118 States, too, are forced to bear substantial
costs, running into the tens of millions of dollars per year in some cases.'19
Many times as much is spent by private sources across the nation.
2D
Considering expenditures alone is, moreover, a misleading measure of the
ESA's ability to commandeer resources. The power of the ESA comes not
from direct governmental expenditures on endangered species preservation,
but from the ESA's ability to effectively seize private property without
compensation. Rather than being caused by a lack of funding or authority,
the ESA's failure can be attributed to the statute's failure to take into
account the fundamental economic problem of scarcity, the resulting fact of
opportunity cost. In this section, we discuss the lack of attention in the ESA
to providing incentives to protect endangered species and habitat. Indeed,
the ESA is a powerful incentive for landowners to manage their land so as to
make it less attractive and useful to the listed species whose presence, due
to the ESA, can impose serious penalties on the landowners who harbor
them. In Part IV.A, we address how these flaws are related to the ESA's
failings under our Third Amendment analysis.
A The ESA Process
When the ESA was created in 1973, there was comparatively little
debate. What debate there was centered on "issues relatively
inconsequential to later developments."' Saving endangered species like
R. J. TON, THE EXPENDAinz Fut1m1R U.S. POLITICS AND THE PRYrECTION OF BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY 257 (1990) ("(Tlhe [ESA] program can point to few successes at least when measured
against its statutory goal"); UNrTED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES:
MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTs COULD ENHANCE RECOVERY PROGRAM 18 (1988) ("Measured against
the logical, absolute standard, the small number of domestic species officially declared
recovered would suggest that the program has been of limited success in recovering species.").
Defenders of the ESA argue that the appropriate measure of the statute's effectiveness is not
recovered species but those whose condition has improved or stabilized. W.R. Irvin, The
Endangered Species Act. Prospects for Reauthorization in TRANSACTIONS OF THE FIFrY-
SEVENTH NoRT AMERiCAN WliDuFE AND NATURAL RESOURCES CONFERENCE 642, 644 (R.E.
McCabe ed., 1992).
118 Robert E. Gordon, Jr., et al., Conservation Under the Endangered Species Act, 23 ENv'T
INVL 359,400 (1997).
119 See id. at 361-63 (discussing Florida).
120 For example, negotiating an incidental take permit outside of an expedited program
available only in central Texas requires negotiations that are "typically time consuming and
costly," lasting *from three months to three years." Thompson, supra note 2, at 317. FWS
approved creation of a "conservation bank" for red-cockaded woodpeckers by International
Paper in Georgia. A "credit" for a pair of woodpeckers is estimated to be worth up to $100,000,
suggesting the high cost imposed on landowners by the presence of the birds. Endangered
Woodpeckers To Get Preserve, AUGUSTA CHRON., Feb. 19, 1999, at C2, available at 1999 WL
13176746.
121 Shannon Petersen, Comment, Congress and Charismatic Megqfauna" A Legislative
History of the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVrL L 463,474 (1999).
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the bald eagle was an uncontroversial environmental goal with broad
support. The ESA
was the comprehensive end product of seventy years of incremental federal
wildlife law. It was spawned by an extremely symbolic issue that fed public
sentiment and support and was buttressed by an amazingly strong and well-
organized set of activist groups and a powerful set of congressional staff and
members. It was defined as a technical problem that would not hurt any
domestic interests and framed prohibitively because no one perceived any
costs of doing so. The act was seen as a low-cost, no-lose legislative
situation.1
22
Like other major national environmental laws adopted in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, the ESA was designed around a command-and-control
model. Experts in the federal government would determine which species
were threatened and endangered, design regulations to ensure that those
species' habitat was protected, and enforce the regulations to ensure public
and private landowners complied.
The ESA process today essentially calls for the biologists of the Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS) to control the use of land, public or private, that
is home to one or more endangered species. 123 FWS biologists, not
landowners, decide if land 24 can be used for logging, farming, or building. In
important respects, government biologists become the land's managers. 125
This is due, in part, to the expansive interpretation the federal government
has given to the ESA. 126
This is also the root of one of the most serious structural problems
within the ESA. Unlike private land managers, government biologists face no
opportunity costs to their decisions to place restrictions on the use of
private land or the land of other government agencies. 12 Because they are
122 STEvEN L YAFFEE, PROHIBrrIVE POLICY: IMPLEmENTING THE FEDERAL ENDANoERED SPECIES
ACT 57 (1982).
123 See Thompson, supra note 2, at 310 ("Section 9 [of the ESA] gives the federal government
immense and broad authority over private land use decisions in many regions of the nation.").
124 The National Marine Fisheries Service handles ocean-going fish.
125 This point is explored at more length in Stroup, supra note 117.
126 The definition of 'taking" has proven especially troubling. Because the term includes
activities that "harm" a protected species and because the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has
defined "harm" to include harming habitat, "landclearing, timber harvest, conversion of
rangeland to cropland, and other activities on private land can potentially take' endangered
species and thus be prohibited by the ESA unless expressly authorized by a permit." Michael J.
Bean, The Endangered Species Act and Private Land: Four Lessons Learned from the Past
Quarter Century, 28 ENvTm. L REP. 10,701,10,702 (1998).
127 Richard L Stroup & Jane S. Shaw, Technology and the Protection of Endangered Species,
paper at the "Technological Advancement and the Changing Context of Public Policy
Justification" conference, sponsored by the Center for Science, Technology, and Society (Jan.
29, 2000) (on file with authors). Government officials understand this, even if they do not
appreciate its importance. See To Ensure That Landowners Receive Equal 7reatment to That
Provided to the Federal Government When Property Must Be Used; Hearing on H.R 1142
Before the House Comm. On Resources, 106th Cong. 40 (1999) (testimony of Jamie Rappaport
Clark, Director, Fish and Wildlife Service) ("Taxpayer money spent on compensation for legally
required agency actions is money not spent on protection and recovering the species needing
the protections of the ESA"--a clear statement of the concept of opportunity cost, if not a clear
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not required to compensate a private landowner for reducing the value of
the landowner's property, they need not consider the value of the alternative
uses of the land. Indeed, the Act forbids such considerations.12 8
However, land is not free, even if government bureaucrats treat it as
free. As a result, the ESA produces non-optimal decisions regarding land
use. Part of the problem is that government land managers allocate too
much land to habitat protection (because a zero price is too low) in those
cases where they have determined that a species must be protected.
Government land managers also have no reason to economize on the true
cost of their efforts by seeking the land and habitat enhancement techniques
that would minimize the cost to society of achieving their goals. Not
surprisingly, their efforts are land intensive because land use is free to
them.' 9 They fail, however, to take even simple steps to increase the
productivity of habitat, because while land is "free," technology is not free,
even when the cost is small.13 The result is that habitat protection is made
more expensive for society than it needs to be-leading to too little habitat
protection overall.
The ESA may exclude economic considerations from its formal
decision-making process, but it cannot exclude the impact of these
considerations on the government's activities. Raising the cost of habitat
protection leads to less of it, because politicians and bureaucrats are more
reluctant to incur the ire of those affected when the cost the government
imposes on the citizenry rises. Failing to force decisionmakers to consider
opportunity costs once a species is listed as endangered leads to overly
intensive habitat protection. We observe, therefore, too much government
action in individual instances where the government seizes more property
rights than it needs to protect a given habitat, simultaneously with too little
habitat protection over all, as the government avoids the political costs of
the ESA by dragging its feet on actions such as listing species 13 1 One would
grasp of its importance.).
128 See, e.g., T.VA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,184 (1978) (The plain intent of Congress was to halt
and reverse the trend towards species extinction, whatever the cost. This is reflected not only in
the stated policies of the Act, but in literally every section of the statute."). The 1978
Amendments to the ESA created "an administrative exemption process that effectively reversed
the Court's determination that the ESA protects species at all costs." Holly Doremus, Listing
Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act. Why Better Science Isn't Always Better Policy,
75 WASH. U. LQ. 1029,1051 (1997). While "solving" the problem when the cost is a multimillion
dollar federal public works project stopped by the presence of endangered species, the
amendments did not significantly alter conditions for private landowners confronted with the
presence of a listed species. Obtaining an exemption from the 'God Squad" remains effectively
out of the reach of most private individuals because of the enormous political capital required
to secure a decision.
129 Stroup & Shaw, supra note 127. In the relatively few cases where the government has
deigned to actually attempt to set out guidelines for what is required of landowners, it has
produced minutely detailed guidelines that set out exacting requirements. See Bean, supra note
126, at 10,703 (describing red cockaded woodpecker guidelines).
130 Because the ESA lacks any provision for requiring even simple acts such as placing nest
boxes in trees and deters landowners from taking such acts on their own, the price necessary to
induce such behavior is made higher by the statute. See Stroup & Shaw, supra note 127, at 4-6.
131 See Ivan J. Ueben, Comment, Political Influences on USFWS Listing Decisions Under
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think the result could hardly be worse for either landowners or endangered
species. Instead of buying as much protection as possible within the budget
for endangered species, resources are uselessly squandered, destroying the
value of individual landowners' properties.
It gets worse, however. Treating a scarce good as free creates perverse
incentives for landowners. In particular, setting the price of land at zero
makes the discovery of a species officially designated as an endangered
species an economic liability.132 And animal species, unlike British soldiers,
can often be kept away by simple land management techniques. The
incentive for landowners is thus to remove endangered species where they
exist and to render land uninviting to endangered species where they do not,
leading to habitat destruction. The loss of habitat is therefore accelerated.
B. Examples
Discovering a listed species on one's land has important consequences
for landowners. In essence, the endangered species becomes a tenant on the
land whose needs as defined by the Fish and Wildlife Service trump the
needs of the landowner and other tenants. Two examples illustrate both the
extent of the impact and the consequences of that impact on the endangered
species.
First, consider the case of Ben Cone. 'In 1982, Benjamin Cone, Jr.
inherited 7,200 acres of land in Pender County, North Carolina.13 He
managed the land primarily for wildlife, planting chuffa and rye for wild
turkey, for example, to help the wild turkey make a comeback in Pender
County. He also frequently conducted controlled burns of the property to
improve the habitat for quail and deer.
Red-cockaded woodpeckers have been listed as an endangered species
since 1970.134 They nest in the cavities of very old trees and are apparently
attracted to places that have both old trees and a clear understory. By
clearing the understory to protect quail and deer and by selectively cutting
small amounts of timber, Cone provided a habitat that probably helped
attract the woodpecker to his land.
In 1991, when Cone intended to sell some timber from his land, the
presence of the birds was formally recorded. Cone hired a wildlife biologist
to determine the number of birds, and the biologist estimated that there
were twenty-nine birds in twelve colonies. According to the FWS guidelines
then in effect for the red-cockaded woodpecker, a circle with a half-mile
the ESA. Tmne to Rethink Priorities, 27 ENVTL L 1323, 1327 (1997) (describing how FWS
responds to political opposition to listing by slowing listing).
132 The price of land for governments may well be negative rather than zero-that is,
governments may profit from regulatory takings. In central Texas, for example, the required
mitigation" necessary to receive an incidental take permit to allow construction of a single
family home is $1,500 per house paid to the city of Austin. Thompson, supra note 2, at 317.
1 3 This example is drawn from Lee Ann Welch, Pruperty Rights Coriflicts Under the
Endangered Species Act. Protection qf the Red-Cockaded Woodpecker, in LND IGHTS: THE
19903' PROPE R Y RIGHTs REBELLION 151,173-79 (Bruce Yandle ed., 1995).
134 Id. at 168.
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radius had to be drawn around each colony, within which timber could not
be harvested.13 If Cone harvested the timber, he would be subject to a fine
and imprisonment under the Endangered Species Act. Based on biologists'
estimates of the presence of the birds and the Fish and Wildlife rules, 1560.8
acres of Cone's land came under the control of the Fish and Wildlife Service,
which cost Cone about $1.8 million by his consultants' calculations.
In response, Cone made several changes in the way he managed the
wildlife and timber. In the past, he clearcut a 50-acre block every five to ten
years. Such cuts simulated some effects of a small, intense fire, the kind that
would start the cycle of succession every five to ten years. The whole of his
property was thus attractive to a variety of wildlife on a sustained basis. But
after the woodpeckers were found and Cone was required to stop logging on
more than 1560 acres, he began to clearcut 300 to 500 acres per year on the
rest of his land. He told an investigator, "I cannot afford to let those
woodpeckers take over the rest of the property. I'm going to start massive
clear-cutting. I'm going to a 40-year rotation, instead of a 75- to 80-year
rotation."'3 Cone's new rotation was designed to do away with old trees in
the areas he could still harvest, preventing the woodpecker from making
nests in these aging trees. As a result, when eventually the acres set aside for
the woodpecker rotted or burned, his land would be free of the
woodpecker.137
. Ben Cone's experience teaches a lesson to all landowners who learn
about his situation: they may be in for similar treatment unless they do
something about it. Indeed, after Cone informed the owner of neighboring
land about possible liabilities in connection with the red-cockaded
woodpecker, he noticed that his neighbor clearcut the property. Overall,
what has been the result of the ESA for the red-cockaded woodpecker? As
Michael Bean of the Environmental Defense Fund said, "The red-cockaded
woodpecker is closer to extinction today than it was a qu~itr century ago
when the protection began."38 Bean recommends that the rules be changed
to help landowners avoid large reductions in the value of their land by the
application of the ESA. But no change is currently in sight.
It is worth noting that private landowners are not the only ones who
perceive problems in FWS's control of their land--so do other government
agencies. Woodpecker advocate Jerome A. Jackson, for example, describes
his encounter with a colonel at Fort Benning, Georgia, when Jackson came
to relocate some woodpecker colonies on the Army's land: "Dr. Jackson, I
ain't never seen a red-coCkadoodled woodpecker and I never want to see
one. You do what it takes to move them."' 3 Jackson complains that
135 Id. at 151, 174.
136 Ike C. Sugg, Ecosystem Babbitt-Babble, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1993, at A12.
137 Cone also took steps to challenge the Fish and Wildlife Service in court, asking to be
compensated for his losses, but FWS avoided that court challenge by negotiating a settlement.
See also Bean, supra note 126, at 10,706 n.43. Eventually, Cone obtained an incidental take
permit and found it unnecessary to follow through on his threat.
138 Stroup, supra note 117, at 1.
139 Jerome A. Jackson, The Red-Cockoded Woodpecker Recovery Progrm, in ENDANGERED
SPECIES RECOVER: FINDING THE LESSONS, ImPROVING THE PROCESS 157, 167 (Tim Clark et al. eds.,
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government agencies resist outsiders getting involved, and they insist that
"their own people" do the work on "'their' lands.""4 Jackson also notes that
two civilian Army employees were indicted for destroying woodpecker
habitat and that the Forest Service threatened an employee with demotion
and transfer for opposing clear cutting of woodpecker habitat.141 If even
government agencies and employees see protected species as a threat to
"their" land, something is seriously wrong with the ESA's approach.
Sometimes the hardships caused by the ESA strike closer to home, as
they do in our second example. In 1986, John Shuler and his wife purchased
a ranch located six miles west of Dupuyer, Montana'4 In August and
September of 1989, grizzly bears attacked the Shulers' flock of sheep on four
different occasions. Each attack was reported to the proper authorities.
Attempts to capture and remove the bears were unsuccessful.
On September 9, 1989, at approximately 10:30 p.m., Mrs. Shuler noticed
that the sheep, illuminated by three large security lights, were circling
nervously in the bedding pen. Mrs. Shuler also heard what "sounded like
something crunching bones" nearby and observed that the family dog would
not leave the porch."4 Shortly thereafter, Mr. Shuler glanced out of a
window and saw something running along the fence line south of his house,
heading toward the bedding pen and his sheep. Shuler grabbed a flashlight
and a rifle and ran outside, barefoot and in his underwear, to the bedding
pen "to keep [the sheep] from getting eaten up."'"
When he reached the bedding pen, Shuler testified "the sheep just
exploded, and they all raced up to the north comer of the bedding pen." To
prevent the sheep from hurting themselves by piling on one another, Shuler
climbed over the fence to the bedding pen and walked toward the center of
the flock. As he moved toward the center of the bedding pen, a heavy
snowfall begin, making it very difficult to see. Shuler testified that, at this
point, "the sheep were boiling all around [him]," when three grizzly bears
emerged from the darkness and sprinted past him, approximately thirty feet
away, heading towards the north end of the bedding pen. Startled, Shuler
dropped his flashlight and fired a shot at the bears.
Immediately thereafter, the sheep started to "flow into" Shuler from the
north end of the bedding pen.14 Suddenly, a fourth grizzly bear rose up on its
hind legs amongst the sheep, approximately thirty feet away from Shuler.
Shuler fired a shot at the bear's throat. The bear fell to the ground, let out a
roar, and got back up. Shuler then lost sight of the bear in the snow and
darkness.
Shuler rushed toward the sheep shelter in an effort to seek protection
from the bear. As he waited next to the shelter, Shuler heard a gate in the
1004).
140 Id at 174.
141 Id. at 162-63.
142 This example is based on Shuler v. Babbitt, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Mont. 1998).
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shelter rattle, indicating either the sheep had hit the gate or the bear was
leaving the bedding pen by climbing over the gate. Shuler waited by the
shelter for a minute until he thought it was safe, and then he retrieved his
flashlight. He walked to the spot where the grizzly bear had stood when he
shot it. He found blood stains in the snow and followed the blood trail to the
location where the bear had climbed over the gate in the wind-break
Shuler picked up the trail of the three other grizzly bears and followed it
south to where it left the bedding pen. After ensuring that all four grizzly
bears had left the bedding pen and that his sheep were relatively safe, Shuler
returned to his home and he dressed. Shuler then drove out to look for the
bear's carcass, but was he forced to discontinue his search due to the heavy
snowfall and poor visibility.
Shuler resumed his search at first light the next morning to determine
whether he had killed the bear or needed to warn his neighbors and the
authorities that a wounded grizzly bear was in the area. He drove his truck
into a pasture, let his dog out of the truck, and proceeded to a pasture just
north of Sheep Creek. The dog disappeared into a low marshy area by the
creek. Shuler stopped his truck and, armed with his rifle, he began walking
towards where his dog was pointing. Shuler did not see anything, but as he
turned to return to his truck, Shuler noticed a grizzly bear, approximately
150 feet away, sitting on its haunches.
Shuler testified that the bear then began "loping in [Shuler's] direction
at an angle .... He was running in a little bit sideways and his right shoulder
was throwing up. There was something wrong with the way he was
tracking."14 6 Shuler fired at the bear from a distance of approximately 125
feet, but missed. Shuler fired again, and the second shot caused the bear to
roar and fall to the ground. The bear returned to its feet and came toward
Shuler. From a distance of fifty feet, Shuler fired a third shot, which knocked
the bear to the ground. Shuler then approached the bear and, realizing that it
was dying, fired a final shot, which killed the bear. He then returned home
and reported the incident to FWS.
In May 1990, FWS served Shuler with a Notice of Violation, charging
him with "taking" a grizzly bear147 in violation of 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) 148
146 Id.
147 Under the ESA, the term "take" means to "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill,
trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." Endangered Species Act
of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994). There is no little irony, of course, in the ESA's use of the
term "taking" given the relatively small degree of protection afforded landowners like Shuler by
the Takings Clause of the Constitution. See generally Thompson, supm note 2 (discussing
appropriate compensation policy in the ESA context).
148 The ESA states that "with respect to any endangered species of fish or wildlife ... it is
unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to take any such species
within the United States .... " 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1994). Equivalent authority exists for
the Secretary of the Interior to restrict takings of "threatened" species under section 4(d) of the
ESA. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1985). The Supreme Court upheld FWS's expansive definition of
"take," which includes "significant habitat modification or degradation that actually kills or
injures wildlife" by significantly impairing essential behavior patterns including breeding,




and proposing a civil penalty of $7,000. In June 1990, Shuler filed a petition
for relief from the assessment, asserting that he had acted in self-defense.
Almost a year later, in April 1991, FWS rejected Shuler's argument and
assessed a $7,000 civil penalty. Shuler appealed and almost two years later,
after a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge found that Shuler did not have
a good faith belief that he was acting in self-defense:
In seeking out the bear, he [Shuler] unjustifiably, unreasonably, and
intentionally placed himself in dangerous circumstances, circumstances upon
which he may not now rely to establish a good faith belief that he was acting in
self-defense.
Mr. Shuler's choice of twice placing himself in the zone of imminent danger
and then shooting the bear cannot be condoned by labeling it self-defense. If
such actions are condoned, the wildlife protection purposes of the ESA will be
defeated. Any rancher wishing to protect his livestock from grizzlies or other
listed species could initiate or provoke dangerous confrontations in order to
justify killing the species.
149
The ALI did reduce the civil penalty, in light of mitigating
circumstances, to $4,000. Shuler again appealed administratively, and more
than three years later, the Ad Hoc Board of Appeals of the Department of the
Interior held Shulees actions, in leaving his house to protect his sheep and
to search for the bear, were reasonably calculated to lead to a conflict.15
Having determined that Shuler provoked the conflict, the Board found that
Shuler did not act in self-defense in "taking" the bear. In addition, the Board
held that Shuler's civil penalty was appropriately increased to $5,000. Shuler
sought judicial review of the Board's decision, and almost two years later,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana reversed the Board's
decision and granted Shuler's motion for summary judgment. 151 After nearly
nine years of costly, legal battles, a court had finally ratified Shuler's right to
be near his sheep, just outside his house.
C. Incentives
These examples are more than isolated incidents in which well-meaning
landowners are caught up in a system aimed at those with bad intentions
that are attempting to eradicate species. Indeed, we doubt that anyone is
interested in eradicating species for the sake of eradicating them. The
problem is not, for example, that an army of hunters is swarming across the
land, seeking to shoot anything that moves--hunters, in fact, have been a
part of some of the most successful voluntary, private efforts at species
preservation. 152 Rather than restraining those intent on evil, the goal of
149 49 F. Supp. 2d at 1168.
150 1d
151 Id. at 1168-469.
162 See, eg., the work of Ducks Unlimited, described briefly in COUNCIL ON ENviRONmENTAL
QuALrm, ENvmoNmENTAL QuAuff 1983, at 153-54 (1983) (describing Ducks Unlimited's efforts
at presenving and restoring habitat through private funding); the work of the Ruffed Grouse
Society, at http'd/www.ruffedgrousesociety.org (last visited Oct. 17, 2000) (describing the
Society's efforts at habitat conservation); and the work of Quail Unlimited, at
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species protection should be to provide space for endangered species to
coexist with other uses of the land. Logging operations like Ben Cone's and
ranching operations like John Schuler's can be conducted to coexist with
species as well as in ways that harm species. Landowners need incentives to
choose the former, the ESA provides incentives to choose the latter.
Finding ways to make private landowners' use of their land compatible
with endangered species protection is essential to preserving species
because the great majority of endangered species exist on private land, and
many exist only on private land. A 1994 GAO report, for example, found that
264 of 712 then-listed species had habitat only on private land.153
Whether the ESA will actually save species--as opposed to simply
making Americans feel good about having a law that purports to do so-will
depend on whether it provides landowners with the proper incentives to
manage their land in ways that are compatible with endangered species
preservation. Unfortunately, as the above examples suggest, the current
form of the ESA provides exactly the wrong incentives.
A landowner who discovers an endangered species on her land has the
incentive to "shoot, shovel, and shut up." Although killing endangered
species is illegal, the chances that anyone will ever know about such
incidents are slim. Some species, like the wolves reintroduced into the
Yellowstone ecosystem, are carefully monitored,16 4 but most are more like
the red-cockaded woodpecker and can be killed with relative impunity.
Most property owners will not, of course, kill protected species, but
they need not do so to defeat the ESA. Even before a species is seen on their
land, the ESA gives private landowners an incentive to manage their land to
preclude the species. Many do just that. For example, the "Developer's
Guide to the Endangered Species Regulation" notes that
[uInfortunately, the highest level of assurance that a property owner will not
face an ESA issue is to maintain the property in a condition such that protected
species cannot occupy the property. Agricultural farming, denuding of
property, and managing of vegetation in ways that prevent the presence of
such species are often employed in areas where ESA conflicts are known to
http://www.qu.org/conservation/quailman.cfm (last visited Oct. 17, 2000) (describing Quail
Unlimited's efforts at habitat conservation). These hunter-based groups spend many millions of
dollars each year to help preserve habitat for the game they hunt, preserving at the same time
the habitat of all associated species. See also TERRY L ANDERSON & DON R. LEAL, ENVIRO-
CAPrrAx2sTsm DOING GOOD WHILE DOING WELL (1997) (describing environmentally sensitive
business's success); John A. Baden & Pete Geddes, Environmental Entrepreneurs: Keys to
Achieving Wilderness Conservation Goals?, 76 DENY. U.L REV. 519,531-34 (1999) (describing
success of entrepreneurial efforts to protect endangered species).
153 GENERAL ACCOUNTINo OFFICE, GAO/RCED-95-16, ENDANGERED SPECIES AcT. INFORMATION
ON SPECIES PROTECTION ON NONFEDERAL LANDS 4-5 (1994). See also Bean, supra note 126, at
10,701-10,702 (-[Wlhat private landowners do on and with their land will likely have a major
influence on the success or failure of the ESA, and to date the results are not encouraging.").
154 Following their release in Yellowstone, for example, a pair of wolves traveled to the Red
Lodge, Montana area. The skinned carcass of one of the wolves was found in the area, and Chad
McKittrick was convicted of the taking. Jennifer Li, Ninth Circuit Environmental Review
Chapter, The Wolves May Have Won the Battle, but Not the War How the West Was Won Under
the Northern Rocky Mountain Wo(f Recovery Plan, 30 ENv'i. L 677,693 (2000).
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occur. This is referred to as the "scorched earth" technique .... 11
Such management techniques are more than anecdotes. Economists
Dean Lueck and Jeffrey Michael examined the way that the presence of the
red-cockaded woodpecker affected timber harvest rates and age of harvest
in North Carolina. 156 Because the birds strongly prefer old-growth Southern
pine for nesting, landowners can keep the woodpeckers out by harvesting
their timber before it is old enough to be attractive to the birds. Lueck and
Michael used data on over 1,000 individual forest plots from the U.S. Forest
Service's Forest Inventory and Analysis, a 1997-98 North Carolina State
University survey of over 400 landowners, and sophisticated econometric
techniques in order to find statistically significant evidence that "increases in
the proximity of a plot to [woodpeckers] increases the probability that the
plot will be harvested and decreases the age at which the forest is
harvested."157 When endangered species are present in North Carolina and
elsewhere, it appears that the interference with land use and the financial
penalties that result cause the preemptive destruction of habitat for species
listed under the Endangered Species Act.
Similarly, the black-capped vireo and the golden-cheeked warbler were
listed as endangered,156 and in Texas, habitat destruction occurred prior to
FWS orders to landowners to set their lands aside from development,
leading to much reduction of the listed birds' favorite habitat.'D An official
of the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department wrote in 1993, "I am convinced
that more habitat for the black-capped vireo, and especially the golden-
cheeked warbler, has been lost in those areas of Texas since the listing of
these birds than would have been lost without the Endangered Species Act
at all."18°
It is not only property rights enthusiasts who recognize the failure of
the ESA to create appropriate incentives. A senior ecologist at the
Environmental Defense Fund blamed the ESA, which he termed "purely
punitive in nature," 61 for its failure to protect species: "[I~t provides no
rewards or incentives to encourage good behavior on the part of
landowners. In particular, it does little to encourage landowners to restore
or enhance the habitats of endangered species on their property.""
155 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BuiWERs, DEvELoPER's GUIDE TO ENDANGERED SPECIES
REGULA7rON 109 (1996).
156 Dean Lueck and Jeffrey Michael, Preemptive Habitat Destruction Under the Endangered
Species Act (Working Paper, Montana State University) (on file with authors).
157 Id,
158 50 C.F.I. § 17.11 (1999). See aLso Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants:
Emergency Rule to List the Golden-Cheeked Warbler as Endangered, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,846 (May
4, 1990) (emergency listing to prevent golden-cheeked warbler habitat destruction).
159 Bean, supra note 126, at 10,706.
160 Larry McKinney, Reautorizing the Endangered Species Act-Incentives for Rural
Landouners, in BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INTO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 71, 74
(1994).
161 David S. Wilcove, Foreward, The Promise and the Disappointment of the Endangered
Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVY LJ. 275,277 (1998).
162 ld.
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Landowners are not the only group for whom the ESA provides the
wrong incentives. By giving regulators excessive power over landowners, it
creates the wrong incentives for regulators as well. For example, a Maryland
state wildlife biologist told one interviewer. "We don't have to prove
anything. If the landowner disagrees with our recommendations then he can
hire an expert!"163 By eliminating the landowner's ability to reject the
government's dictates, the ESA eliminates the incentive for government
personnel to negotiate and persuade, and it creates an incentive for them to
use their coercive power to dictate land use.
Mixing the absolutist command-and-control structure of the ESA with
imprecise statutory language creates additional problems. A 1998 summary
of the lessons learned from the first twenty-five years of the ESA by an
Environmental Defense Fund attorney concluded that the case law adds
up to considerable confusion about the circumstances under which habitat
modification constitutes a prohibited taking of endangered species. That
confusion, in turn, means that landowners who want to know what they can do
without running afoul of the law often face a very real practical problem: no
one can give them a definitive answer.
164
Even where FWS has done a reasonable job of setting the rules out in
advance, as it has with the red-cockaded woodpeckers, the guidelines that
result are lengthy, detailed, and complex.' 65 Thus, even those that want to
comply with the law find themselves frustrated by their inability to know the
law's requirements.
The command-and-control approach also allows government agencies
to make mistakes nationally instead of merely locally. Earlier in the
twentieth century, for example, governments worked to eradicate
hawks--paying bounties to promote the killing of hawks-because hawks
preyed on other birds.16 Even the Audubon Society promoted the
eradication of eagles, hawks, falcons, and other such birds, because raptors
killed song birds. 167 One conservation-minded individual who disagreed with
government policy toward raptors, Rosalie Edge, scraped together the funds
to lease and ultimately buy hundreds of acres of prime raptor habitat on
Hawk Mountain in Pennsylvania. She then barred hunting from the area.
Through her efforts and the efforts of other individuals, Hawk Mountain
Sanctuary became an internationally known conservation, education, and
research organization. 6 When the government turned from eradicating to
protecting raptors, there were raptors left, because Rosalie Edge and her
163 James A. Adldns, Ethical reanent of Private Property Owners When Implementing
Protection Measures for Rare and Endangered Species, 26 N. KY. L REv. 421, 421 (1999)
(quoting interview with Glen Therres, Wildlife Biologist, Maryland Department of Natural
Resources, in Wye Mills, Md. (1998)).
164 Bean, supra note 126, at 10703.
165 See id at 10,703-10,704.
16 See Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, The New Feudalism in Property Law: The





supporters had been able to use private property to "opt out" of the
eradication campaign. Despite its conservation focus, the ESA may well
make mistakes similar to those of the raptor-eradication programs. 6
Because of its comprehensive scope and command-and-control approach,
however, no modem Rosalie Edge will be able to "opt out" of the mistaken
mandates.
V. THE ESA AND THE "LIVING CONSTITM ON"
A "living Constitution" interpretation of the Third Amendment that bars
the ESA requires several interpretative steps. A textual approach to the
Amendment suggests that in order to run afoul of the Amendment, a
government would have to 1) quarter 2) soldiers in 3) a house 4a) without
the consent of the owner of the house 5a) during peacetime or 4b) during
wartime unless 5b) done as prescribed by law. For the ESA to violate the
Third Amendment, therefore, it must be true that i) the requirements of the
ESA for private property owners are analogous to requiring the "quartering"
of endangered species on the property owner's land, ii) the endangered
species are analogous to soldiers, iii) that the property owner's land is
analogous to the "house" mentioned by the Amendment, and iv) that the
wartime provision (4b and 5b above) either does not apply or that the ESA
does not meet the "prescribed by law" requirement for involuntary
quartering in "time of war." In this Part, we examine each of these
requirements in turn. hi making our interpretation we must keep in mind
Justice Brennan's admonishment that "the genius of the Constitution rests
not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone,
but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems
and current needs."117
A. Quartering
Is requiring a landowner to involuntarily host an endangered species on
her land "quartering" within the meaning of our interpretation of the Third
Amendment? We believe this is the most straightforward part of the analogy
to the quartering of soldiers. Just as the Quartering Acts required
landowners to allow British soldiers to make use of their property, so the
Endangered Species Act requires landowners to allow non-human, but
nonetheless potentially unwelcome, species to occupy their land.
Indeed, the traditional rights of landowners are stronger with respect to
169 For example, Steven Minta and Peter Kareiva note that the ESA was passed at a time
when "ecology was enamored of niche overlap theory and Lotka-Volterra models and filled with
a vision of some soon-to-be-realized grand theory encoded in the form of rigorous mathematical
statements. No longer is there much faith that ecology has a general theory." Steven C. Minta &
Peter M. Kareiva, A Conservation Science Perspective, in ENDANOERED SPECIES RECOVERY:
FINDING THE LESSONS, IMPROVING THE PROCESs 275, 276 (Tim W. Clark et al. eds., 1994). As a
result of these changes in scientific theory and knowledge, "[i]t is now accepted that species-
based conservation alone is incomplete and ineffectual ... ." Id at 277. Yet the ESA continues
to embody the species-centric approach.
170 Brennan, supra note 3, at 610.
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non-human trespassers than they are with respect to human trespassers. A
colonist who encountered unwelcome British soldiers on his land would
have, in the absence of the Quartering Acts, been able to bring a trespass
action against the soldiers and seek their removal in court, but he could not
lawfully kill the soldiers A modem landowner who encountered an
unwelcome member of a non-human species on her land, in the absence of
the ESA or other legal restrictions such as hunting regulations, would be
able to kill the animal. Moreover, while the British government recognized
the principle of its responsibility for problems caused by its soldiers,"'
neither the federal nor the state governments today recognize their liability
for damage caused by "their" wildlife to private property.172 Finally, colonists
who were forced to involuntarily quarter soldiers were often, in theory at
least, entitled to some compensation unlike those quartering endangered
species. Therefore, the "living - Constitution" should recognize the
requirements of the Endangered Species Act as 'quartering" within the
meaning of the Third Amendment.
B. Soldiers and Species
Are red-cockaded woodpeckers sufficiently similar to redcoats that the
principles of the Third Amendment apply to woodpeckers as well? We
believe so. Americans objected to the involuntary quartering of soldiers on
their property, because the soldiers' presence imposed costs on the property
owners. Not only did the property owner lose the use of the part of his
property that the soldiers physically occupied, but he also suffered loss of
privacy in other areas of his home, externalities from the behavior of the
soldiers and of their visitors on the premises, losses from the increased wear
and tear attributable to the soldiers' presence, and losses from the necessity
of dealing with the British military about the numerous small problems that
arose while the soldiers were quartered.
These losses are analogous to those that the ESA imposes on property
owners. For example, the host to a red-cockaded woodpecker may not use
the portion of the property that the woodpecker physically occupies. The
landowner may also not use the buffer zone around the area physically
occupied by woodpeckers--an area which can be quite extensive and take
up far more room than even the most boisterous redcoat. Landowners are
required to deal with government regulators concerning the use of the
landowners' land, much as the American colonists had to deal with the
British Army. At least a colonist saddled with a British soldier could ask the
soldiers not to damage his home. A landowner whose land is "quartering"
red-cockaded woodpeckers is forbidden to disturb the woodpeckers, even
as the birds damage the landowner's property.1 73
171 See, e.g., PAaoEuAS, supra note 34, at 195 (describing punishment of a soldier for stealing
from a civilian).
172 See, e.g., Siclman v. United States, 184 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1950) (United States lacks
ownership, control, or possession of wild geese, and is therefore not liable for their trespasses).
173 We assume that the problem of interspecies communication is minimal in this
context-that is, running at a red cockaded woodpecker while shouting *shoo! shoo!" is likely
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The analogy holds true even with respect to the pre-Intolerable Acts
practice. Colonists upon whom (or in whose communities) British soldiers
were quartered bore uncompensated losses as a result of the soldiers'
presence. Thus, for reasons unrelated to their own conduct, these colonists
experienced significant losses of their property rights. Similarly, those
finding themselves host to red-cockaded woodpeckers experience an
arbitrarily allocated loss of their property rights.
However, more than takings of property rights are involved here.
Landowners may well find themselves in the same position as the
Shulers--and if there is a "more terrible engine of oppression than... a
company of soldiers,"17 4 it would be an angry grizzly bear. Species should
therefore be considered the "living Constitutional" equivalent of soldiers.
C. Houses and Land
The most problematic aspect of the analogy between the ESA's
requirements and the quartering of soldiers concerns the location of the
unwelcome guests. 17 At least under the Quartering Act as amended in 1774,
soldiers were, quartered in Americans' homes, making their presence much
more objectionable than if they were simply camping on the back forty. 17
On the other hand, endangered species are quartered out-of-doors. 17  Is this
sufficient to distinguish their presence?
We believe not The Constitution was written against a backdrop of
common law, including common law understandings about property.178 The
Founders understood the difference between sole and shared ownership of
property-the difference between a fee simple absolute and a tenancy in
common-even if the drafters of the ESA did not The quartering of soldiers
on private property reduced the property owner's interest in his property
from the 'sole dominion' characteristic of fee simple ownership to a form of
shared control. Soldiers' presence inside the walls of the home was surely
more objectionable than their presence in the field outside, but soldiers in
the field were nonetheless objectionable."7 Therefore, arguing that the ESA
to convey the message that the birds are unwelcome. (Different strategies may be required for
species such as grizzly bears.) Given the extent of restrictions on "disturbing" red cockaded
woodpeckers, this might be difficult under the current regulatory regime.
174 COOLEY, supra note 96, at 435.
176 See Wurfel, supra note 5, at 733 (-An attempt to quarter troops in private buildings in the
United States would probably bring on controversy as to the meaning of the word 'house' as
used in the Amendment.-).
176 As noted earlier, Gerlach, supra note 76, argues that the Act did not authorize quartering
in homes. We have opted to argue the more difficult case, that the practice of quartering
included private homes, because this is consistent with the Amendment's text.
177 Although we know of no recorded instance of this, it is possible that an endangered
species might take up residence within the walls of a home. Insects, for example, might infest a
house. We hope environmental regulators would refrain from protecting an insect under such
circumstances, but we are not optimistic about how such a conflict might be resolved.
178 Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L REv. 1003,
1111-12 (1985) ("Federalists first argued that the law of the United States; including the
Constitution, must inevitably be formed against the backdrop of the common law of England.").
179 See COOLEY, supra note 96, at 435; Wurfel, supra note 5, at 731.
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does not require us to tAke grizzly bears and woodpeckers inside our homes
is not enough to save the statute from entanglements with the Third
Amendment.
Moreover, in many instances, the ESA can have at least as severe an
effect on property rights as a soldier in the home. Property owners have
been forbidden to build new homes or protect existing homes on property
where endangered species are located.180 The grizzly bears on the Schulers'
land were not in their house, but nonetheless the bears threatened the
Schulers' safety. Indeed, grizzly bears are extremely dangerous--probably
more so than even inebriated British soldiers.
A landowner that is forced to share her property with endangered
species might experience similar privacy violations as a landowner that is
forced to share her property with soldiers. Most people would object to
soldiers peering through their windows and doors or observing them
engaged in private activities. Is it any different if the "Peeping Tom" turns
out to be a woodpecker or a bear? There is obviously a difference of degree,
but anyone who has experienced the feeling of being observed by an
unknown other while hiking can testify that it is only a difference of degree.
Indeed, it is not impossible that some people will object more to inter-
species "Peeping Toms" than they would to humans-particularly with
regard to species such as grizzly bears.
One objection to this analysis might be that other amendments
distinguish between houses and other portions of property. For example, the
Fourth Amendment draws a distinction between the interior of a home and
the zone outside the "curtilage" of the house.1 81 We do not believe this
distinction applies here because we are talking about a different kind of
privacy interest than that protected by the Fourth Amendment. The Framers
did not design the prohibitions of the Third Amendment merely to keep a
person from seeing what another is doing (where walls make sense), but
rather they intended the prohibitions to protect against forced sharing of
property (where walls are irrelevant).
Here we can draw some support from the lone serious circuit court
opinion dealing with the Third Amendment. In Engblom v. Carey,"s the
180 See Stroup, supra note 117, at 5-6 (describing how FWS, to protect the Stephens's
kangaroo rat, forbade homeowners in Riverside County, California from shielding their homes
with fire breaks). See also National Endangered Species Act Reform Coalition, How Has The
ESA Impacted People, at http//www.nesarc.org/esamain.htm (ast visited Feb. 25, 2000)
(describing how construction on a subdivision in Fontana, California has been halted to protect
the Delhi Sands Flower Loving Fly and how a landowner was prevented from building a house
on her property near Austin, Texas by FWS's requirement of an "incidental take permit,"
because the land had been deemed "biologically necessary for the continued existence of the
golden cheeked warbler, black-capped vireo, and/or the cave invertebrates [cave bugs]" until
her congressional testimony on the problem prompted FWS to reconsider).
181 See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (setting out four factor test that
resolves what is within home's curtilage: "the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to
the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of
the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from
observation by people passing by").
182 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982).
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Second Circuit was faced with a claim by prison guards who had had their
leased apartments on prison grounds occupied by National Guard troops
during a strike. The court found the leaseholds protected, holding that
"property-based privacy interests protected by the Third Amendment...
extend to those recognized and permitted by society as founded on lawful
occupation or possession with a legal right to exclude others. " " By tying
the Third Amendment's coverage to the property-based right to exclude,
rather than to the character of the property as a home, Engbiom supports a
broad reading of the Amendment's scope of protection despite its reliance
on a dictionary-based reading of the term "home."8 4 Moreover, endangered
species do not come alone--FWS agents who monitor the species will also
be present on the property at least some of the time.I85 The presence of
endangered -species on land should thus be the "living Constitutional"
equivalent of soldiers in the home.
D. Peacetime and Wartime
The text and history of the Third Amendment show a clear intent to
distinguish between the level of restrictions applicable to quartering during
peacetime and wartime. 18 In peacetime, the property owners' consent is
required before soldiers can be quartered. In wartime, legal process is all
that is required. The rejection of two strengthening amendments to the text
by the House reinforces this conclusion. 87 During wartime, a lessened
restriction applies. How does this affect the power to quarter species instead
of soldiers?
The first question to be resolved is what precisely distinguishes
peacetime and wartime. Professor Tom W. Bell persuasively argues that the
Third Amendment's language leaves a gap for times of neither peace nor
war, which he labels "unrest," when the executive retains power over
quartering. 84 Bell's conclusion is reinforced by his survey of quartering
behavior during the War of 1812 and the Civil War.1 9 Therefore, we will
consider the following three alternatives under which the ESA might be
justified: conditions analogous to peacetime, to unrest, and to wartime.
The baseline is the peacetime standard when the owners consent is
required. Unless the threatened extinction of species invokes a condition
183 Id at 962.
184 Id. at 962n.11.
185 A federal district court rejected a challenge to a 1947 rent control statute based on the
allegation that the statute "is and always was the incubator and hatchery of swarms of
bureaucrats to be quartered as storm troopers upon the people in violation of Amendment III of
the United States Constitution." United States v. Valenzuela, 95 F. Supp. 363, 366 (S.D. Cal.
1951). The court's consideration of the Third Amendment claim, made without the benefit of
subsequent developments in the "living Constitution" theory, should not be a bar to renewed
consideration of such claims in the ESA context.
186 Indeed, in this regard it was less restrictive than the contemporaneous British practice.
Wurfel, supra note 5, at 729.
187 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIoms, supra note 81, at 218-19.
188 Bell, supra note 5, at 135-36.
189 Id. at 136-40.
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analogous to wartime and congressional passage of the ESA is all the legal
process necessary to satisfy the wartime standard, the ESA must be judged
under the stricter peacetime consent requirement Since the ESA clearly fails
that standard, the peacetime and wartime distinction is crucial.
What about. unrest? Bell notes that allowing the executive branch the
power to act during times of civil unrest could be justified as required by the
need for quick and decisive action. 190 For example, unrest in the Whisky
Rebellion of 1791-1794 was solved by the quick application of military
force. 19' If an unrest category under the Third Amendment exists by
implication, it would seem to be a category that covers emergency
situations. Serious unrest that required longer term responses would also
require congressional action, which would bring the wartime category into
play. Therefore, long term restrictions on land use could not be justified
under the unrest category.
Are we in a "war" to save endangered species? The "war" metaphor is
applied to everything from illegal drugs to poverty. Environmental pressure
groups on all sides sometimes use rhetoric that suggests a wartime approach
to environmental issues.'m However, more than mere words are needed to
invoke the lessened wartime standard. Merely using war-like rhetoric cannot
be the test of the existence of a genuine emergency.. The debate over the proposed amendments to the Third Amendment's
text suggests a solution. In opposing the requirement that a civil magistrate
approve wartime quartering orders, a delegate to the convention noted "that
cases might arise where the public safety would be endangered by putting it
in the power of one person to keep a division of troops standing in the
inclemency of the weather for many hours .... "9'3 This language and
reasoning confirms what a common sense19 reading of the Third
Amendment's text suggests: the wartime exemption from the consent
requirement was intended to prevent holdouts from jeopardizing public
safety.
190 Id. at 133.
191 Id. at 132.
192 See, e.g., Eke C. Sugg, Caught in the Ac. Evaluating the Endangered Secies Act, Its
EFfects on Man and Prospects for Reforin, 24 CUMB. L REv. 1, 2 (1993-1994) (quoting National
Audubon Society which said that a Congressional debate over the ESA will be "the
environmental battle of the decade"); Frederic J. Frommer, Four State Dams on List of
'Wastfid' Prjects, SEATTLE TIMS, Mar. 4, 2000, at A13 (quoting Mark Van Putten, president of
the National Wildlife Federation who said, "It is time for the Army to stop waging war against
our environment.*); Michael Upske, How Rachel Carson Helped Save the Brmon Pelican, NAT'L
WLDLIuE, Dec.-Jan. 2000, at 44, 49 ('Carson crafted her indictment of the chemical companies
and government agencies that, in the name of pest control, were waging war on the
environment").
193 THE COMPLE BILL OF RIGHTs, supra note 81, § 5.2.1.2.a, at 219.
194 Common sense!?! No, we are not switching theories of interpretation in mid-stream. The
living Constitution" approach may be nonsensical as a whole, but the individual pieces of it
must still pass the test of elementary logic to succeed. The Third Amendment could not,
therefore, be read to require that individuals be allowed to use illegal drugs in the privacy of
their own homes, no matter how much privacy language was used to justify such a claim. At
least, we think not.
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Applied to the ESA, this suggests that there is a limited exemption from
the consent requirement for emergency situations. While, as bumperstickers
remind us, "extinction is forever," the threatened extinction of a species
alone does not qualify as an emergency under either the wartime or unrest
categories. An extinct species may later turn out to have held the cure for
cancer or some other wonder drug, or it may be an important national
symbol like the bald eagle. Nonetheless, the extinction of any particular
species but our own is not comparable to a threat to public safety. Even if
we forego a cure for a particular disease because of the extinction of some
species, humanity in general, and Americans in particular, will continue to
exist 
196
The limited exemption from the consent requirement suggests that in
circumstances where a species is threatened with extinction in the short
term, the federal government has the power to temporarily insist on
mitigating measures and other land use controls that effectively quarter the
endangered species on private land while making arrangements to 1) remove
the species to public land, 2) purchase the right to maintain the species on
the private land (by purchasing the land outright or through some other
means), or 3) condemn the land through the power of eminent domain We
do not believe that the Third Amendment would support a precise time limit,
we do note that we are discussing a matter of weeks or months, not years,
before the restriction can no longer apply involuntarily.
E. Incorporation
A final question is whether the Third Amendment's principles apply
only to the federal government or whether they are "incorporated" by the
Fourteenth Amendment and thus also apply to state governments. 1 6 The one
circuit court to consider the question held that the Third Amendment was
incorporated. 19 Under the total incorporation theory advanced by Justice
Hugo Black, " all of the first eight amendments are incorporated. However,
under the prevailing selective incorporation theory created by Justice
Brennan, each right guaranteed by the Bill of Rights requires an independent
analysis of whether the right in question is "fundamental" enough to warrant
incorporation. The Third Amendment is one of four rights in Amendments
196 See David Ehrenfield, Why Put a Value on Biodiversity? in BIODIVEosmr 212, 215 (E.O.
Wilson ed., 1988) ("We do not know how many species [of plants] are needed to keep the planet
green and healthy, but it seems very unlikely to be anywhere near the more than a quarter of a
million we have now .... And if we turn to the invertebrates, the source of nearly all biological
diversity, what biologist is willing to find a value-conventional or ecological-for all 600,000
plus species of beetles?"). But see JOHN BRUNNER, THE SHEEP LooK UP 456 (1972) (British-
authored novel suggests extinction of Americans is necessary to solve world environmental
problems).
196 Incorporation may be unnecessary, as independent state law grounds may exist to object
to state ESAs. Thirty-three states have state constitutional provisions nearly identical to the
Third Amendment, and ten more have differently worded provisions. Bell, supra note 5, at 144.
197 Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957,961 (2d Cir. 1982).
198 See JOHN E. NOwAK ur AL, CONSTrtONAL LAW §10.2 315 (3d ed., 1986). However, the
Supreme Court continually rejected the incorporation theory.
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I-VIII that thus far remains "outside the selective fold."199 It may be that the
most "plausible explanation for failure to incorporate [the Third
Amendment) is that a proper case never materialized: the right rarely arises
in modern litigation."M
Without debating the legitimacy of incorporation itself, something well
beyond the scope of this Article and an issue that is now largely settled, we
argue that the principles identified above as underlying the Third
Amendment are well within any reasonable definition of fundamental. 20 1
Protecting property from unreasonable intrusions by the government is
something on which we imagine we are as close to a core American value as
we can get. If the Third Amendment bears the weight that our "living
Constitution" interpretation places upon it, incorporation is a relatively easy
step.
VI. FIXING THE ESA
The problems with the ESA, as noted above, stem from its lack of
attention to incentives, its command approach, and its failure to consider the
problem of scarcity. These flaws relate to the ESA's unconstitutionality.
Other than their uniforms, surprisingly few differences exist between FWS
biologists today and the British colonial military authorities acting under the
Intolerable Acts. Just as FWS biologists today ignore the problem of scarcity,
so did the British colonial military authorities ignore the scarcity problems
created by their quartering of soldiers. Likewise, just as FWS biologists
today seek to command landowners to welcome endangered species on
their land, rather than finding incentives to induce them to do so (and to find
low-cost habitat providers and techniques to minimize land restrictions), so
too British colonial military authorities sought to solve the lack of barracks
space by commanding colonists to accept soldiers into their homes.
Alarmingly for the prospects of endangered species, environmental pressure
groups today seem to be modeling their behavior on Lord Loudoun's after
the Seven Years War-instead of turning to incentives to save species, they
insist on an ESA that will make resistance to the statute inevitable. Red-
cockaded woodpeckers may thus soon be as rare as red coats in America.
Considering the problem in light of the Third Amendment also offers an
important political insight concerning the strength of constitutional
provisions. As noted earlier, the quartering issue was connected to the
political questions surrounding a standing army. The Federalists, who
199 AMAR, supra note 97, at 220. The other rights "outside the fold" are the right to keep and
bear arms and the rights to grand and civil juries. Id See also William J. Brennan, The Bill of
Rights and the States in THE EVOLVING CONSITUTIoN 254, 263 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1983)
(enumerating the rights remaining unincorporated by 1969).
200 AMAR, supra note 97, at 220.
201 Although his interpretation of the Third Amendment differs somewhat from ours, Amar
makes a similar argument concerning its incorporation protecting privacy under his own theory
of incorporation. See id at 267 (IThe Third Amendment, on this reconstructed account, now
bridges together a home-centric Second Amendment and a Fourth Amendment that was from
the beginning protective of the private domain .... *).
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opposed the Bill of Rights, saw the solution to both in elected civilian
supremacy over the army.
If the standing armies issue was solved, as proposed, by placing control of the
military establishment in the hands of a government which in turn was
controlled by the people; then the problem of involuntary quartering would
itself be solved, since no popularly controlled government would engage in
such an onerous practice.
2°
One of the lessons of the ESA is that the Anti-Federalists, who this
argument failed to convince, were correct popular control of government is
no guarantee against arbitrary imposition of tremendous costs on individual
property owners.
We need not fear that applying Third Amendment principles to the ESA
will lead to mass extinctions. The original Third Amendment quartering
problem has been so successfully "solved" today that the United States now
has too many domestic military establishments, not too few. Reform of the
ESA, to make it compatible with the Third Amendment, will lead to far
greater recovery of species than the few that the ESA has "saved" thus far.
This is not mere speculation. In 1982, amendments to the ESA created a
new exception to the ESA's "nearly absolute prohibition against taking" to
allow creation of negotiated "Habitat Conservation Plans."2°0 Rather than
harming endangered species, these amendments actually strengthened the
protection of species by giving FWS what even environmental advocates
concede was "its first practical means of influencing what private
landowners did on their land."w4 Complete replacement of the ESA with a
scheme of positive incentives would further strengthen species protection.
In addition, it is important not to forget that the government always has the
option of protecting species by purchasing or condemning the land
necessary to protect habitat outright Although potentially expensive,
requiring an expenditure of resources would force the government to face
the opportunity costs of its actions.
We therefore suggest that the following principles be applied to
endangered species protection:
F/rt, do no harm. Government programs that provide incentives to
destroy habitat should be eliminated. Such programs include subsidies for
the draining of wetlands, for agricultural production (encouraging
production on marginal lands and the overuse of pesticides), and for the
highly subsidized building of dams that have harmedfish habitat, as well as
allowing wild horses and burros to greatly degrade federal land in the
Southwest.
Provide positive incentives for habitat If discovering an endangered
species on one's land led to economic rewards, landowners would invest
202 Fields & Hardy, supra note 5, at 423-24.
203 Pub. L No. 97-304,96 Stat. 141 l(codiliedas amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1994)).
204 Bean, supra note 126, at 10,708.
2W Richard L Stroup & Jane S. Shaw, Environmental Harms from Federal Governent
Pblicy, in TAIUNG THE ENvONMmENT SERIOUSLY 51-52 (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle eds.,
1995).
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considerably more toward making their properties attractive habitat.
Purchasing the rights necessary to protect habitat or rewarding landowners
for habitat conservation would increase the available habitat' Getting rid
of the ESA as it now exists would remove the incentives to destroy the
habitat
Empower private actors. Private actors have made tremendous
progress toward saving habitat and species.207 Creating incentives for them
to expand their activities will lead to additional progress.
Require government actors to face opportunity costs. Land use
decisions carry costs. For those decisions to be made correctly, the decision
makers must understand the opportunity costs of their choices. Requiring
full compensation for landowners would accomplish this.
The simplest way to implement these principles would be to repeal the
ESA entirely and to begin with a fresh approach built around incentives and
recognition of opportunity cost and scarcity principles. Resources currently
being used under the ESA would be used instead to purchase property rights
necessary to provide habitat or to reward landowners who enhance
endangered species habitat. We believe such a program would result in
vastly increased amounts of habitat, because it would replace the current set
of incentives to destroy habitat with positive incentives to preserve and
enhance habitat.2m
Forcing government and nonprofit organization land managers to face
the opportunity costs of their actions would also yield significant benefits. If
the amount of resources to be applied to protecting endangered species is
limited, and it surely is, choices must be made. The current system
politicizes the choices of which species and habitat to protect. Although the
ESA may be written in absolutist form, its implementation is by human
beings-men and women who must fear the consequences for their careers
if they cross a powerful bureaucrat, congressperson, or interest group.
Submerging political choices in scientific babble and delay merely conceals
the role of politics. Placing the ESA "on a budget" would force those choices
into the open and it would provide common measures of effectiveness (for
example, acres of habitat per dollar spent, costs of species saved) with
which to evaluate results.
Note that we are not suggesting that the traditional fixes advocated by
some environmental pressure groups would fix the ESA. These groups
advocate mitigating development by requiring developers to set aside some
portion of their land for conservation purposes or using special tax
20 Properly understood, incentives do not include programs that depend on an initial
destruction of property value, followed by a "carrot" of partial restoration of value, as is the
case with the habitat conservation plans and "no surprises" polcies.
207 Supra note 168 and accompanying text.
208 Note that it would not be necessary for the government or nonprofit groups to purchase
land outright in all, or even most, cases. Thus, it raises the concern that "far more [land would
be needed] than anyone realistically expects will be acquired any time in the foreseeable
future." Bean, supra note 126, at 10,707. Only the specific property rights necessary to preserve
habitat, not the full fee simple bundle, would be needed in most cases, as in the "adopt-a-
pothole" program described in Stroup, supra note 117, at 9.
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assessments on development to fund land acquisition.m Such measures do
not solve the ESA's problems that we identified above any more than
requiring colonists to set aside portions of their land for soldiers would have
solved the colonial quartering problem. Such measures do make the ESA's
command-and-control approach less expensive, but they rely on coercion as
the "incentive," and they fail to force government to face opportunity costs.
VII. CONCLUSION
To our knowledge, we are the first to suggest that the ESA violates the
Third Amendment--at least the first to do so in print.2 10 We have to admit
tlat our tongues have been pressed firmly in our cheeks during at least some
of the time we spent writing this Article. We do not think Justice Brennan's
approach to the Constitution is the right one. Nonetheless, we recognize that
Justice Brennan was an influential justice and his approach to constitutional
interpretation is now widely accepted.
We also do not expect that any court will soon adopt this view of the
Third Amendment" Indeed, we expect that those who take a sufficiently
elastic approach to the Constitution's text to adopt our interpretation have
political preferences that would preclude consideration of the value of
property rights in the way we have proposed. Of course, that dependence on
political beliefs is one of the problems with the "living Constitution"
approach.
Nonetheless, the principles and conditions that motivated the drafting
and adoption of the Third Amendment do apply to the problems of the
Endangered Species Act. Even if quartering a species on private land is not
constitutionaUy the same as quartering a soldier in a private house, it does
not look that much different to the unwilling host. The difference between a
red coat and listed wolf, bear or even a red-cockaded woodpecker is only a
matter of degree when the landowner cannot make normal use of the land as
a result of the presence of the listed animal. A terrible irony of the ESA, as
we have pointed out, is that absent the ESA's land-use controls, many
species would be quite welcome to most landowners.
As Peggy Noonan concluded in her essay on the Third Amendment,
"'[o]nly the dead have seen the end of war,' and only the dead have seen the
end of the constant tension that inevitably exists between citizens and their
2w See Bean, supra note 126, at 10,709.
210 One of us briefly suggested so in Stroup, supra note 117, which is the inspiration for this
article, although without the "living Constitution" analysis. Indeed, we are among the first to
suggest that the Third Amendment has any relevance to modem society and to attempt to
rescue it from the constitutional storeroom where it languishes along with the "titles of nobility"
clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
211 Although her theory is not based on a living constitutional approach, Peggy Noonan
recently characterized the Third Amendment as "a sleeper now" but argued "it may come
awake." Noonan, supra note 5, at 4. If a court did adopt our proposed interpretation, then
Noonan's prediction that "[slome day we may be grateful that [the Third Amendment] is there"
may come true outside the apocalyptic scenario she hypothesizes. Id at 9.
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governments over issues of governmental abuse of power." 21 2 Until the ESA
and all environmental laws respect private property rights and thus provide
proper incentives for private individuals and agents of the government, these
laws will continue to fail to actually protect endangered species and the
environment. The principles that we offer here are one small step in that
direction.
212 Noonan, supru note 5, at 9.
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